THEOLOGY

A Monthly Journal of Historic Christianity

Edited by the Rev. S. C. Carpenter, D.D., Master of the Temple, c/o S.P.C.K. House, Northumberland Avenue, London, W.C. 2, to whom MSS. should be sent.

Vol. XXIX DECEMBER, 1934 No. 174

EDITORIAL

The near approach of Christmas sends us back to the opening chapters of the Gospels. Some readers are puzzled, sometimes even made rather uneasy, when they discover for the first time that the earliest Gospel has no story of the Nativity. There are various reasons that might be alleged for this "silence of St. Mark." It might be supposed that he did not know any story of the Nativity. It might even be asserted that no one knew it; there was at that time no story of the Nativity; it had not yet been invented. On the other hand it might be said that, if St. Mark's Gospel contains the recollections of St. Peter, it is proper that he should begin where the recollections of St. Peter would naturally begin. We cannot help noticing that, after a rather compressed exordium, detail begins with i. 16, at the point where Simon comes into the narrative. It is reasonable to conclude that Simon would know something about the Baptism and the Temptation and the original message of the Lord. He would know that they had occurred, but they would not be within his personal experience. This accounts for the briefness of his mention of these things, but mention them he must. He must somehow avoid committing the unpardonable fault of beginning his story with himself. And even more he must, or rather John Mark in introducing his story to the public must, relate it to the historical background against which the reminiscences are to be viewed. In point of fact we have in Acts x. 37-40 what purports to be St. Peter's own description of the limits of the Gospel as it was first proclaimed. It appears that it began "from Galilee after the baptism which John preached." Then follow the Ministry, the Passion, the Resurrection; in fact, the contents of St. Mark's Gospel. Here then is a sufficient reason for the limitation of its scope. It was because "we are witnesses of all things which he did both in the land of the Jews, and in Jerusalem"

(Acts x. 39). No argument can be drawn from "the silence of St. Mark." His silence is not significant. Or anyhow it does not signify what is suggested.

It is of real importance that St. Mark's Gospel begins with the Baptizer. That, by the way, is his historical title. As Professor Burkitt reminds us, "Saint John Baptist" is a name in the Church Calendar. What he was actually called at the time was "the Baptizer." His figure is important. There was a certain tendency, even at the early date when St. Mark was writing, to resolve the facts of Galilee and Jerusalem, and above all of Calvary, into a Docetic haze. Ignatius a little later shews clearly that the danger of mythologizing was by no means contemptible. There were those who said that the Lord "suffered only in semblance." The Magnesians are instructed that they must be "fully persuaded concerning the truth of the passion and the resurrection; which took place in the time of the governorship of Pontius Pilate; for these things were truly and certainly done by Jesus Christ our hope." There is even a special emphasis laid on the Nativity, as being a warrant of genuine humanity. Ignatius is quite sure about the Virgin Birth, and he thinks of it not in the least as a thing to be apologized for, but as one of the planks in his anti-Docetic case. Thus "who was of the race of David, who was the Son of Mary, who was truly born." And again, "truly of the race of David according to the flesh, but Son of God by the divine will and power, truly born of a virgin and baptized by John that our righteousness might be fulfilled by him." In view of the false "spirituality" which is here implied, we may well believe that one of the things that John Mark had to do was to exhibit the real footprints planted by our Lord on the real earth. The fact of John and the immersion in the actual waters of Jordan were links with history. But for St. Mark's insistence upon John, the other Evangelists, desiring, as they did, to take away all danger of magic and Docetism and to domesticate by their accounts of the Nativity what might otherwise have seemed a mere portent, would have found the task more difficult.

What is the reason for the inclusion of the Nativity in the second editions, if we may so speak of the work of the other two Synoptists, of the Gospel story? It is this. The public had said, "If, as you suggest to us, this Jesus is the Redeemer of our life, we want to know how He took hold of it. We know that He was baptized in the Jordan and began a public ministry and died and rose again. But that does not satisfy us. That might

be, or anyhow might seem to be, a mere Theophany, the passing of a divine Visitant through the life of earth. What was the manner of His arrival ?" The purpose of the Nativity stories was not to make things more marvellous, but to exhibit the reality of the Incarnation. The word "domesticate" was used just now. Some of our readers may remember a witty and incisive article in the *Hibbert Journal* in July, 1922, by Mr. T. J. Hardy on "The Supernatural under Domestication." The writer deprecated the process, but what he meant was really the secularizing of religion, thinking of it as Mr. Barkis thought of marriage. "Not an exhilarating picture of the married state to set before Corydon and Thyrsis—this penurious pantaloon, ageing fast and rocky on his pins, nosing slyly the capabilities of his Peggotty, her turn for apple pasties and general cooking, and whether she is likely to keep down expenses and wear herself to the bone; truly a flat-footed courting!" Nevertheless, Barkis are we, annexing religion as a maid-of-all-work. Thank Heaven men still fall in love; but we have heard the last of falling into religion! All that concerns us now is the finality of comfort. We must have a religion that will help us 'to make the world a better place.'"

For this we have no commendation. What we mean by "to domesticate" is to shew that the Redeemer was positively domiciled in the life of earth. It may be—and there is not a little in recent theological literature which drives this home—that the search for reality will reveal to our astonished eyes, still blinded by those rags of inherited "Liberalism" which cling to all who were born within the nineteenth century, the disconcerting fact that the Jesus of history is an intractable Figure, hard to include in the ordinary, easy categories. Mr. Chesterton said in *Orthodoxy*, "Instead of looking at books and pictures about the New Testament I looked at the New Testament. There I found an account, not in the least of a person with his hair parted in the middle or his hands clasped in appeal, but of an extraordinary being with lips of thunder and acts of lurid decision, flinging down tables, casting out devils, passing with the wild secrecy of the wind from mountain isolation to a sort of dreadful demagogy; a being who often acted like an angry god—and always like a god."

All this is not precisely and wholly what we mean by domestication, but it is all part of it, not to be shirked. It does not matter how Messianic, how supernatural, how divine a picture you paint of our Lord. By all means shew all that, if the evidence is there to justify it. Meantime it is vital to shew at the same time that the divine did genuinely arrive

and tabernacle among us. And remember the arrival is sealed by the story of a humble Birth, in a shed, with no doctor, no anæsthetic, no twilight sleep. "Events," said Maurice, speaking of the second chapter of the Gospel according to St. Luke, "the belief of which has affected all the art and speculation of the most civilized nations of the modern world, are recorded in fewer words and with less effort than an ordinary historian would deem suitable to the account of the most trivial transaction. Such marvellous associations have clung for centuries to these verses that it is hard to realize how absolutely naked they are of all ornament. We are obliged to read them again and again to assure ourselves that they really set forth what we call the great miracle of the world."

In view of this, is not "domesticate" a right and proper word? John Neville Figgis used to revel in the simplicity of the Gospel. When grave, high-minded agnostics were pained, and even shocked, at the idea of calling the Maker of the stars "by a pet name," he remembered that an old mystic writer had spoken of God as "full homely and full courteous," and added that the pet name was very childlike after all. There is something about Christmas which shews that even the divine Transcendence has this tender quality, this intimate touch. It is true that even at Christmas there is a shadow of the coming Cross. Yet on the other hand, when in a few weeks from now we are brought to the Cross, the Collect for Palm Sunday will be heard speaking of God's "tender love towards mankind" in that he sent His Son, "our Saviour Jesus Christ, to take upon him our flesh." And so Bob Cratchit's Christmas party and even the bit of sentiment about Tiny Tim may not be dismissed. The Sun of righteousness arises, and there is healing, even for crippled children, in His wings.

Seeing that the tremendous and the homely have somehow to be combined, it is a happy thing that the simplicity of the actual Christmas Festival is ushered in by the trumpets of Advent. There is no fear that Christian people will really fall into the error at which Maurice hinted. How could they when they have trembled through Advent at the thunders of Isaiah? The old picture of the Second Coming, visible, with clouds of glory and a great white throne, is not painted by the modern preacher. Such terrors as now assail our imagination come from a quite different quarter and take a quite different form. They are scientific terrors. They are the rumours which reach us of a dying sun. Another million years or so, and the sun, it seems, is doomed, unless cosmic rays or some other as yet un-

identified physical force should prove able to repair the wastage. It is physically a formidable prospect. But it leaves us undismayed. The picture of the last few terrestrial beings huddled along the line of the equator, and even there slowly dying of cold, is in itself terrible enough. But, if "our citizenship is in heaven," it does not touch us where we live. We never thought that the material world was everlasting. Meantime the Advent message stands. Partly, it reminds us of the necessity of Revelation. The evolutionary process does not save. Salvation is a thing which arrives from elsewhere. And on its other side it reminds us of Judgment. Our evolution, and even our very manner of accepting the offered salvation, lie under the shadow of impending Judgment. We know that the picture of the Great Assize is only a picture. Nevertheless, there is a supernatural world. It has already broken through into our world in the form of divine inspiration, in the form of divine revealed perfection, in the form of divine communicated grace. In its entirety, in that which is described as "the adoption, to wit, the redemption of our body," it is something for which we have to "wait." And the searchingness of the judgment which is involved in that is the only thing of which it is right to be afraid.

Our first article is unusually long. So was Macaulay's Essay on Bacon. Macaulay himself spoke of its "interminable length." Lord Jeffrey said: "What mortal could ever dream of cutting out the least particle of this precious work to make it fit better into your Review? It would be worse than paring down the Pitt Diamond to fit the old setting of a Dowager's ring." The biographer writes: "In the end, the article appeared entire; occupying 104 pages of the Review; and accompanied by an apology for its length in the shape of one of those editorial appeals to 'the intelligent scholar,' and 'the best class of our readers,' which never fail of success." *Mutatis mutandis*, that is what we have to say about Dr. Bouquet's article.

The author of "The Eighteenth-Century High Churchman" wishes to make one slight correction in his article. On page 285, line 12, "1737" should have been "1747."

Relying upon a preliminary announcement, we were misinformed in supposing that the text of the New Testament which Messrs. Dent are now publishing in instalments is here and there corrected according to the Revised Version. We now understand that the text is that of the Authorized Version, and that any corrections made in the interests of more accurate translation are printed separately in an Appendix.

and tabernacle among us. And remember the arrival is sealed by the story of a humble Birth, in a shed, with no doctor, no anæsthetic, no twilight sleep. "Events," said Maurice, speaking of the second chapter of the Gospel according to St. Luke, "the belief of which has affected all the art and speculation of the most civilized nations of the modern world, are recorded in fewer words and with less effort than an ordinary historian would deem suitable to the account of the most trivial transaction. Such marvellous associations have clung for centuries to these verses that it is hard to realize how absolutely naked they are of all ornament. We are obliged to read them again and again to assure ourselves that they really set forth what we call the great miracle of the world."

In view of this, is not "domesticate" a right and proper word? John Neville Figgis used to revel in the simplicity of the Gospel. When grave, high-minded agnostics were pained, and even shocked, at the idea of calling the Maker of the stars "by a pet name," he remembered that an old mystic writer had spoken of God as "full homely and full courteous," and added that the pet name was very childlike after all. There is something about Christmas which shews that even the divine Transcendence has this tender quality, this intimate touch. It is true that even at Christmas there is a shadow of the coming Cross. Yet on the other hand, when in a few weeks from now we are brought to the Cross, the Collect for Palm Sunday will be heard speaking of God's "tender love towards mankind" in that he sent His Son, "our Saviour Jesus Christ, to take upon him our flesh." And so Bob Cratchit's Christmas party and even the bit of sentiment about Tiny Tim may not be dismissed. The Sun of righteousness arises, and there is healing, even for crippled children, in His wings.

Seeing that the tremendous and the homely have somehow to be combined, it is a happy thing that the simplicity of the actual Christmas Festival is ushered in by the trumpets of Advent. There is no fear that Christian people will really fall into the error at which Maurice hinted. How could they when they have trembled through Advent at the thunders of Isaiah? The old picture of the Second Coming, visible, with clouds of glory and a great white throne, is not painted by the modern preacher. Such terrors as now assail our imagination come from a quite different quarter and take a quite different form. They are scientific terrors. They are the rumours which reach us of a dying sun. Another million years or so, and the sun, it seems, is doomed, unless cosmic rays or some other as yet un-

identified physical force should prove able to repair the wastage. It is physically a formidable prospect. But it leaves us undismayed. The picture of the last few terrestrial beings huddled along the line of the equator, and even there slowly dying of cold, is in itself terrible enough. But, if "our citizenship is in heaven," it does not touch us where we live. We never thought that the material world was everlasting. Meantime the Advent message stands. Partly, it reminds us of the necessity of Revelation. The evolutionary process does not save. Salvation is a thing which arrives from elsewhere. And on its other side it reminds us of Judgment. Our evolution, and even our very manner of accepting the offered salvation, lie under the shadow of impending Judgment. We know that the picture of the Great Assize is only a picture. Nevertheless, there is a supernatural world. It has already broken through into our world in the form of divine inspiration, in the form of divine revealed perfection, in the form of divine communicated grace. In its entirety, in that which is described as "the adoption, to wit, the redemption of our body," it is something for which we have to "wait." And the searchingness of the judgment which is involved in that is the only thing of which it is right to be afraid.

Our first article is unusually long. So was Macaulay's Essay on Bacon. Macaulay himself spoke of its "interminable length." Lord Jeffrey said: "What mortal could ever dream of cutting out the least particle of this precious work to make it fit better into your Review? It would be worse than paring down the Pitt Diamond to fit the old setting of a Dowager's ring." The biographer writes: "In the end, the article appeared entire; occupying 104 pages of the Review; and accompanied by an apology for its length in the shape of one of those editorial appeals to 'the intelligent scholar,' and 'the best class of our readers,' which never fail of success." *Mutatis mutandis*, that is what we have to say about Dr. Bouquet's article.

The author of "The Eighteenth-Century High Churchman" wishes to make one slight correction in his article. On page 285, line 12, "1737" should have been "1747."

Relying upon a preliminary announcement, we were misinformed in supposing that the text of the New Testament which Messrs. Dent are now publishing in instalments is here and there corrected according to the Revised Version. We now understand that the text is that of the Authorized Version, and that any corrections made in the interests of more accurate translation are printed separately in an Appendix.

and tabernacle among us. And remember the arrival is sealed by the story of a humble Birth, in a shed, with no doctor, no anæsthetic, no twilight sleep. "Events," said Maurice, speaking of the second chapter of the Gospel according to St. Luke, "the belief of which has affected all the art and speculation of the most civilized nations of the modern world, are recorded in fewer words and with less effort than an ordinary historian would deem suitable to the account of the most trivial transaction. Such marvellous associations have clung for centuries to these verses that it is hard to realize how absolutely naked they are of all ornament. We are obliged to read them again and again to assure ourselves that they really set forth what we call the great miracle of the world."

In view of this, is not "domesticate" a right and proper word? John Neville Figgis used to revel in the simplicity of the Gospel. When grave, high-minded agnostics were pained, and even shocked, at the idea of calling the Maker of the stars "by a pet name," he remembered that an old mystic writer had spoken of God as "full homely and full courteous," and added that the pet name was very childlike after all. There is something about Christmas which shews that even the divine Transcendence has this tender quality, this intimate touch. It is true that even at Christmas there is a shadow of the coming Cross. Yet on the other hand, when in a few weeks from now we are brought to the Cross, the Collect for Palm Sunday will be heard speaking of God's "tender love towards mankind" in that he sent His Son, "our Saviour Jesus Christ, to take upon him our flesh." And so Bob Cratchit's Christmas party and even the bit of sentiment about Tiny Tim may not be dismissed. The Sun of righteousness arises, and there is healing, even for crippled children, in His wings.

Seeing that the tremendous and the homely have somehow to be combined, it is a happy thing that the simplicity of the actual Christmas Festival is ushered in by the trumpets of Advent. There is no fear that Christian people will really fall into the error at which Maurice hinted. How could they when they have trembled through Advent at the thunders of Isaiah? The old picture of the Second Coming, visible, with clouds of glory and a great white throne, is not painted by the modern preacher. Such terrors as now assail our imagination come from a quite different quarter and take a quite different form. They are scientific terrors. They are the rumours which reach us of a dying sun. Another million years or so, and the sun, it seems, is doomed, unless cosmic rays or some other as yet un-

identified physical force should prove able to repair the wastage. It is physically a formidable prospect. But it leaves us undismayed. The picture of the last few terrestrial beings huddled along the line of the equator, and even there slowly dying of cold, is in itself terrible enough. But, if "our citizenship is in heaven," it does not touch us where we live. We never thought that the material world was everlasting. Meantime the Advent message stands. Partly, it reminds us of the necessity of Revelation. The evolutionary process does not save. Salvation is a thing which arrives from elsewhere. And on its other side it reminds us of Judgment. Our evolution, and even our very manner of accepting the offered salvation, lie under the shadow of impending Judgment. We know that the picture of the Great Assize is only a picture. Nevertheless, there is a supernatural world. It has already broken through into our world in the form of divine inspiration, in the form of divine revealed perfection, in the form of divine communicated grace. In its entirety, in that which is described as "the adoption, to wit, the redemption of our body," it is something for which we have to "wait." And the searchingness of the judgment which is involved in that is the only thing of which it is right to be afraid.

Our first article is unusually long. So was Macaulay's Essay on Bacon. Macaulay himself spoke of its "interminable length." Lord Jeffrey said: "What mortal could ever dream of cutting out the least particle of this precious work to make it fit better into your Review? It would be worse than paring down the Pitt Diamond to fit the old setting of a Dowager's ring." The biographer writes: "In the end, the article appeared entire; occupying 104 pages of the Review; and accompanied by an apology for its length in the shape of one of those editorial appeals to 'the intelligent scholar,' and 'the best class of our readers,' which never fail of success." *Mutatis mutandis*, that is what we have to say about Dr. Bouquet's article.

The author of "The Eighteenth-Century High Churchman" wishes to make one slight correction in his article. On page 285, line 12, "1737" should have been "1747."

Relying upon a preliminary announcement, we were misinformed in supposing that the text of the New Testament which Messrs. Dent are now publishing in instalments is here and there corrected according to the Revised Version. We now understand that the text is that of the Authorized Version, and that any corrections made in the interests of more accurate translation are printed separately in an Appendix.

These notes had been completed when there befell the Editor a disturbing experience which will result before long in a change of address. He has received a number of kind and hopeful expressions of goodwill, for which he is most grateful. It is hoped that the change of address—which is not material to contributors, inasmuch as communications should still be addressed to c/o S.P.C.K.—will not impair the character of THEOLOGY. In fact, that character might even gain a little. Deutero-Isaiah looked for help from one who was to be raised up from the North, who is alternatively described as a ravenous bird from the East. But that was Cyrus, whose services to the cause of true religion can at best be called indirect. It may be that from the peaceful and salubrious air of the South-West there will come that which will be of some direct service in the great crusade against Bel and Nebo and all other idols.

A GERMAN CATHOLIC PHILOSOPHY OF RELIGION*

THE purpose of this paper is to expound as clearly as is possible in the space at one's disposal the general theory of religion recently set forth by Fr. Erich Przywara,† the learned Munich Jesuit.

There are several reasons for undertaking this task. In the first place, so much prominence is being given to Protestant opinions, whether those of Barth or of the various Nazi theologians, that Anglicans may well derive the impression that there is little or no intellectual activity among German Catholics —which is very far from being the case. Dr. Adolf Keller, in his book on Barth and the world-wide reactions to his theology, singles out Przywara (though he is not so well known as Karl Adam) as the most important philosophical theologian in contemporary Germany, and the most weighty exponent of the Catholic standpoint; and British and American readers ought to be in a position to follow the discussion which is proceeding between Barthians and continental Catholics. In the second place, it is well worth while to refute the rash statement of the Hungarian scholar Dr. Ambrosius Czakó that the philosophy of religion is necessarily a Protestant study. Fr. Przywara's work should do something to demonstrate that that is not the case.

Thirdly, there is urgent need for a Christian interpretation of the relation between Deity and the creaturely, which avoids the charge of pantheism (as, for example, Julius Hecker levels it against Professor Raven), and yet respects "the assertion of unbroken continuity," against which Emil Brunner inveighs.

Fourthly, there is the satisfaction derived from studying a "general theory of religion" (the phrase, of course, is Auguste Comte's) which proceeds from a rather unexpected quarter. In one of his well-known essays, Friedrich von Hügel once wrote:

> "Catholicism was in the time of Aquinas, and even still in that of More, a great intellectual culture and rich mental training school, as well as the home of saints; but since, say, 1720, and still more since the French Revolution, it has shrunk more and more to being, usually and easily, just that home; the culture and the school lie now very largely elsewhere, and I do not say to gain, but even fully to retain, such culture and such

* The substance of a lecture on the Stanton foundation given in the Divinity School at Cambridge in the May term, 1934.

† Pronounced: Tschĕ-vāra.

training within the Roman communion is now distinctly difficult. But pray let us have no exaggeration: though they are all *un peu à côté*, and though they do not dominate the popular presentation of the Catholic faith, ripe scholars and often ripe minds exist sure enough now still within that great Church."

Such a mind would appear to be that of Fr. Przywara, and it is significant that in the massive handbook upon Modern Philosophy recently published by Oldenbourgs of Munich, the essay which I am about to summarize lies side by side with one written (from his own now familiar standpoint) by Emil Brunner, and is plainly regarded by the general editors as (at least semi-officially) representative of the philosophical outlook of the great communion of which its author is a member.

The essay itself (which appears in the volume referred to above along with five others, itself the fifth) is not very long (104 pages), and it falls into four parts.

First, the statement of the problem.

Second, the proposed solution, that of the *analogia entis* principle.

Third, the application of this principle to (*a*) the relation of Deity to the creation; (*b*) the nature of Deity; (*c*) grace and free-will; (*d*) worship, mysticism, and conduct; (*e*) the Trinity.

Fourth, historical illustrations of the operation of the principle within Catholicism.

Barth himself has declared that the *analogia entis* is the invention of anti-Christ, and what we have here, therefore, is by way of being a reasoned defence of the principle against such a violent attack. Our author is, indeed, conscious throughout his essay of the existence of the Barthian movement and of the affirmations which it makes. Occasionally he employs references to contemporary German literature which we cannot all be expected to follow; and he sometimes coins new words, or uses old words in a special sense of his own. My endeavour will be to elucidate the meanings of these words as they occur, and also to draw attention to the special phrases which he uses to convey his meaning.

Przywara begins by indicating his line of approach, and shews that he is prepared to start out from the experiences of human consciousness. This consciousness, as he says, oscillates between an experience of self-containedness (Immanence) and an orientation upon a Being independent of its consciousness (Transcendence), and further also between an experience of an inward concept of an ego, correlated with an object which is independent of it, and an experience of an individual concrete human ego which senses itself in the double tension of mind-body, indi-

vidual-community. This analysis gives him his plan of study. He sets out to consider Religion (i.) as an experience derived from the consciousness of the subject-object relationship; (ii.) as an experience proceeding from the consciousness of the concrete ego. Throughout the whole essay the strong Hegelian background is noticeable. Terms are taken over from the Logic in their usual sense, and the assumption is accepted that process is dialectical, so that *oscillation* is a valid description of the cause of the various modes of thought and belief. The idea of thesis and antithesis as held together or related in a "Spannung" or tension is fundamental to the theory which is here set forth. English folk are not so familiar as their continental cousins with the dialectical outlook, and we need to notice that both the communist philosophers and Barth are at pains to see that it is not forgotten. Dialectic considered as pure logic is neither realist nor idealist, but is merely an account of the process of thought considered as a process of growth or development; and as pure logic it is (as MacMurray says rightly) "one of the supreme achievements of the human mind, the final discovery of how all movements of an organic character can be thought about and understood—the mind's instrument for exploring the world." This is clearly Przywara's position, though, as we shall see later, he strictly subordinates this dialectic process to the operations of another law.

And now for his analysis. Consciousness is, he says, aware of an infinite unity of completeness ("Einheit der Fülle" combined with "Unendlichkeit"). This infinite unity of completeness is what other philosophical theologians have called by other names: Self-Existent Being, The Eternal, Actus Purus, Necessary Being, The Numinous, The Whole, The Absolute, and so on (or simply God). It is, perhaps, an advantage that Przywara avoids using any of these conventional labels, and chooses his own way of describing it.

He then proceeds to describe the three fundamental modes (Grundrichtungen des Gesamtbewusstseins) in which the ego experiences and relates itself to this infinite unity of completeness. The first of these is immanence (Zuständlichkeit), which combines *self-containedness* with relatedness to the category of eternity *within* consciousness. This tends to be undogmatic, a-moral, and æsthetic, and finds God in the depths of the ego.

The second is transcendence (Gegenständlichkeit), or a condition of *opposedness* to an objectively conceived unity of completeness and infinitude which is *beyond* consciousness. This is dogmatic, intellectual, and concerned with the "Wholly Other," aloof from the ego.

Through these two vertically opposed activities there cuts a third and (so to speak) horizontal one. It is distinguished from the first two in that it knows no *given* unity of completeness, nor any *given* infinity, either internal or external, but only that which is *propounded—i.e.*, a unity of completeness which never *is*, but remains always and only the goal or intention or unfolding of an urge, and an infinity which is one not of being (Sein) but of endeavour (Streben). Przywara calls this mode of experience and activity by a special name: "becoming-actualness" (Tatständlichkeit) or transcendentality. It is, he says, marked by continuous striving towards the creation of the actual, and is ethical, voluntaristic, and distinguished by the combination of tranquillity with struggle (Ruh im Streben). As an actuality it is only the "between" (das Zwischen), that which lies 'twixt intention and realization.

Since, however, in every single one of these three modes of experience and activity all acts of consciousness are contained, even though variously combined, the three modes are only opposed to one another in mutual exclusiveness by a process of *abstraction*. In reality each single one is combined with the other two, so that in each one of them conversely may be perceived a threefold division, according as we think of them as relatively pure or commingled with each other. These subtypes arise, therefore, as the result of the oscillation of each mode in the direction of one or other of its neighbours. If we take (A) Immanence, we can either have it pure or balanced, or oscillating towards (B) Transcendence, or towards (C) Transcendentality. This yields a conception of Deity as the *coincidentia oppositorum*, as in the Indian Maya and Nirvana, the Chinese Tao, the Rabbinic speculation about the Shechinah, and the philosophy of polarity such as we get in Schelling. If we take (B) Transcendence, we can either have pure deism, or a mode produced by oscillation towards (A) or towards (C). If we take (C) Transcendentality, we can either have it pure, in which case Deity is the Ideal of creation—the *Nisus* of Alexander, towards which things ever strive; which never is, but is always going to be—or oscillating towards (A) or (B).

This classification ultimately yields nine types of experienced activity, of which Przywara gives examples as follows:

A

1. Pure immanence. Schleiermacher, The Romantics, Natorp (earlier phase).
2. Transcendent immanence. French, English, and Italian moderns and vitalists.
3. Transcendentalist immanence. Simmel, Spranger.

B

1. Pure deism. The encyclopædists.
2. Immanental transcendence. Plotinus.
3. Transcendentalist transcendence. Arabic Aristotelianism, Hegel, Antithetical Lutheranism (combining love and fear).

C

1. Pure transcendentality. Neo-Kantianism, Maimûni, Solomon Maimon.
2. Immanental transcendentality. Fichte, Hartmann, Schopenhauer, Nietzsche, Scheler.
3. Transcendent transcendentality. Windelband-Rickert, Otto.

But these three modes of active experience determine not only the conception of Deity, but also the relation of Deity to the soul. Type A gives this as the ceaseless relation of desiring to be one, and to know one's self in the unity. Type B as the attitude of aloofness (distanz), and of purely regarding or contemplative prayer uttered from afar, in which the aloofness of reverence is gradually maximized. Type C aims at a unity through the juxtaposition of the attitudes implied by the types A and B, and at an attempt to hold them in tension. Here, however, human effort is baffled. It would seem as though only an *explosive* tension could be arrived at—*i.e.*, a tension so forced that the incompatible elements were always ready to fly apart, and so render a "religio" or link, binding them in alliance, an impossibility.

Przywara then goes on to a second analysis, that of the consciousness of the concrete ego. He considers it as involving four tensions:

(*a*) The relationship of body to spirit.
(*b*) The converse relationship of spirit to body.
(*c*) The relationship of individual to community.
(*d*) The converse relationship of community to individual.

Each of these four, as he points out, connects with one of the three fundamental modes of active experience (Grundrichtungen), producing, in every one of these three modes, a variety of types of thought and praxis.

Thus the mode of active experience which has been called "self-contained relatedness" (Immanence) produces four types. Where immanence involves the sinking down of the ego, and senses infinity as "self-in-the-whole," we have either (*a*) Immanentist nature-mysticism as typified in Indian philosophy, and also in the Renaissance philosophy of Giordano Bruno; or (*b*) Humanity-mysticism, as represented in the Chinese mystical philosophers and in the "history-mysticism" of the Romantics.

Where the ego remains in evidence, and senses infinity as "within the self," we have (*a*) various sorts of body-cultus, (*b*) German ego-, spirit-, or mind-mysticism.

Similarly the mode of active experience called "opposed-ness" (Transcendence) furnishes four different types of Deism:

(*a*) Deism of the Encyclopædia, in which Deity is the transcendent Teleological Principle, or natura naturans of Spinoza.

(*b*) Deism as the cult of the Deity who guarantees nature or humanity, as in the *Monadology* of Leibniz or Kant's *Critique of Pure Reason*. These two types must inevitably fall apart into either atheism on the one hand, or into nature- and humanity-mysticism on the other.

(*c*) Deism as the cultus of the perfect physical individual.

(*d*) Deism as the cultus of the perfect individual conceived as pure mentality or thought.

Here are included Platonism, Neo-Platonism, the theory which lies behind Greek orthodox cultus of ikons, and also the pure science of the Reformation-Renaissance period.

In the third place the mode of active experience called "becoming-actual-ness" (Transcendentality) attempts to get rid of the obvious one-sidedness of pursuing any one of these eight types, by seeking to hold together the contradictory basic modes which produce them in a tension of opposites, and to resolve the four subsidiary tensions along the line of "unendliche Streben nach . . ." (infinity of striving towards. . . .)

Here there are four types, grouped in pairs:

(*a*) The struggle after unqualified Nature as being Divine, lately represented in the teaching of Ludwig Klages.

(*b*) The struggle towards a full humanity as being Divine, represented in the teachings of Wundt, Cohen, and Keyserling. The Divine in both cases is "Idea," and so transcendent to the process of struggle, and simultaneously "inward principle," and so immanent. The contradiction between the "individual" type of mystical immanence (whether as corporeally or spiritually individual) and the corresponding element of rationally worshipping transcendence finds its resolution in the ethically conditioned transcendentality of the infinite striving after individuality, which again is a double one:

(*a*) On the one side stands the type of the bodily individual, which for the individualistic transcendentalism of Nietzsche or Stefan Georg contributes the meaning and aim of the infinite struggle, with the transcendent Super-Man or Greek God as its human ideal.

(*b*) On the other side stands the type of the ideal spiritual ego, which represents for a large part of German idealism the objective

of the same endless striving, with the transcendent Deity of late antiquity (visualized as the Spirit of pure thought) for its ideal.

But once again there is no stability in this effort at a synthesis of contradictions. Only an *explosive* unity is achieved; the two sides fly apart again sooner or later, and man is ultimately disappointed of his quest.

Finally, there is a third analysis, undertaken in answer to the question: Is religion (i.) Act of God, from above downwards; or (ii.) Act of Man, from below upwards?

(i.) Would give us Theopanism or absolute supernaturalism.

(ii.) Would give us Pantheism or absolute rationalism.

Religion comprehends on the one side the innermost life of man: in the tidal movement of life it seeks for the Absolute Point. Yet, on the other hand, this Absolute seems as such unable to stand separate from all that is relative in the creatively. Where shall we find a solution of this antinomy?

The answer, says Przywara, varies according to the three modes of experience.

If the immanence mode be followed, the answer will either be: "Act of God," as in typically Indian piety, and in the *theologia negativa*, with its submergence of life; or "Act of Man," as in the polarity philosophy of the waning Renaissance and the Romantics, with its exaltation of what Nietzsche calls "life's grandiose symphony."

If the transcendence mode be followed, the answer will either be "Act of God," as in rigid Catholic traditionalism, and in the revelation-philosophy of the Romantics down to Hegel; or "Act of Man," as in the rationalism of the Aufklärung from Hobbes to Kant.

If the transcendentalist mode be followed, the answer will either be "Act of God," typified in the "consuming zeal" of Calvinistic Deity and in the (Plotinian) mystical flow of the Divine will, as in the doctrines of Pico of Mirandola, of Zwingli, and of Luther, with his idea of "rapi" (being caught up and away into the stream of God's energy); or Act of Man, as in certain forms of Neo-Kantianism.

But the two sorts of answer seem incompatible, and sometimes (i.) appears as though it were (ii.) camouflaged. (Is this, perhaps, true of Barthian transcendentalism?)

And so the attempt is once again made to fuse them into one, or rather to hold them in synthesis; and for this third type also, says Przywara, the result is an *explosive* tension, and not, as desired, a tension-in-unity.

Is, then, religion impossible, and is man's quest for a synthesis of his modes of experience a mere hunt after a will-o'-the-wisp?

Clearly neither Barthianism alone, nor Pantheism, nor dialectic Atheism will suffice. All three leave man baffled and dissatisfied. Thus we come to the second part of Przywara's essay.

The solution proposed is that of the *analogia entis*. It is, of course, not new, but is found in Thomism, and was the subject of an exposition by Cardinal Cajetan, but it is now brought forward as a timely aid to our modern perplexities. Anglicans may be disposed to give it sympathetic consideration, seeing that the classical English treatise in philosophical theology, Butler's *Analogy*, involves a somewhat similar process of reasoning. What, then, is it? Briefly, it runs as follows:

The creaturely is the analogy of Deity, so that Deity and the creaturely are related in a tension, which is nevertheless not explosive, but merely open. Whereas in Deity existence and essence are, as Aquinas shews, identical, in the creaturely they are a tension. Deity is neither the absolutizing of something creaturely, nor the spiritual aspect of the Whole, nor Will, nor Thought, nor Personality, nor Idea, nor yet the ideal Unity of opposites which occur in the creation. He is wholly *beyond*, and, as Aquinas says, *tanquam ignotus*, beyond all comprehension, and so *known only by analogy*. Creation in all its aspects is thus the revelation of Deity hitherward from above (von oben her). It is not, however, a likeness of Deity in which He is in some sort under constraint, so that He can be "sized-up" as a sort of world-formula. It is a likeness which testifies from itself to a Deity who is beyond similitude, Who by an inscrutable decree has chosen this likeness, but could choose a thousand others if He would. The way is thus "open upward" to an infinite extent, and the metaphysical comprehension of God is neither that of identity, as in rationalism, nor that of dualism, as in irrationalism, nor that of congruence, as Scheler has it, but a tension-in-unity of reverent love and loving reverence. The philosophy of religion is thus the scientific reflexion upon the tension between Deity and the creaturely, a tension which, prior to reflexion, is a naïve relationship.

If, as in the case of the various systems previously submitted to analysis and classification, the form of the scheme be that of a Hegelian triad, the problem is that of solving contradictions, and this ends, as has been pointed out, in an explosion, in which thesis and antithesis either fly apart violently as incompatibles, or annihilate each other. If, however, the form of the scheme be the *analogia entis*, the problem becomes that of solving tensions, and this leads ultimately to balance and equilibrium, and to peace and rest in God.

In some respects the Deity of Przywara is not unlike that of

Barth. He is Other, and not simply an absolutized relative, as in the three modes of what we may call natural religion, which really destroy God, while at the same time demanding His existence as Necessary Being. But in the principle of *analogia entis*, the essentially super-creaturely absolute fixed point is found in Deity, and Przywara thus not unnaturally claims that the God of orthodox Christian theism (he says, of Catholicism) is the only truly transcendent Deity. The difference between the two thinkers is seen in the rejection by Barth of the *analogia entis*. He will not allow the existence of similitude between the creaturely and Deity. It is true that the iconoclastic biblicism of Deutero-Isaiah, let alone that of the Decalogue, would seem to exclude analogy. Yet what is really excluded is the limitation of worship to the symbol, not the worship of the Other throughout that wherein He is veiled, yet figured.

Przywara then goes on to shew that the principle of *analogia entis* preserves the three fundamental modes of active experience while depriving them of their explosiveness in relation to one another, and so furnishes them with a real and enduring synthesis.

Thus Catholic immanence is God from above downward acting in us (Gott in-über-uns), so that He is inaccessible as well as indwelling, and the dark night and the *unio mystica* exist in tension. Here is no gloating quietism, but an *invenire quærendum*; whereas ordinary immanence confines Deity within His creation, to Catholic mystics God is the ever Greater, dwelling in light unapproachable. There is no absorption into God; but a never-quenchable dynamic consciousness of our abiding separateness from God warns the soul against the peril of allowing itself to be moved "by God alone," as Molinos erringly taught.

Catholic transcendence is not merely God seen above from below, but God active from above downward and hitherward. It is a "being known of God." Nor is it a function of the transcending experience, or a mere construction, but a discovery of that which is forthcoming.

Catholic transcendentality (becoming-actualness, Ruh im Streben) is different from non-Catholic, because it is not a search for unity in contradiction, but a unity in tension; not an explosive tension, but a stable unity. Moreover, Catholic "Streben" is creaturely, and is not a symbol for God, but activity directed towards and in the Presence of God.

Religion is thus vindicated as a possible and actual relationship between Deity and creature. The duty of the creature is to make the purpose of Deity actual, to *surrender*,* not to give;

* We thus find a profound basis for that which "the groups" have lately so much and so correctly insisted upon. But they have fallen into a major heresy in

and the relation of God to the world becomes clearer, both negatively and positively.

Negatively, the Catholic basis of religion has a certain prejudice against all so-called "proofs of God" which, whether consciously or unconsciously, set Him forth as "Means to" &c. —*e.g.*, as the Guardian of a well-planned ordering of the world, as the Provider of human unity, as the Establisher of the right relationship between virtue and its deserts, as the Sanction of the state, the Satisfier of human needs, or (may we add?) as the Principle of concretion. He is not the mere hypothesis to explain the creation, but *The Lord God*. The creation as directed upon Deity, not Deity as the supplement to the creation, is the real truth. Creation is the *processio Dei ad extra*, the manifestation of His great glory ("non ad augendam, nec ad acquirendam, sed ad manifestandam perfectionem suam," as the Vatican decree puts it.) In surrender, then, the creature gives itself over in adoring and unrestrained abandonment to the greatness of God, Who is beyond all need of His creatures, and Who is to be appraised not according to His power for the saving of souls, but for the mystery of His inscrutable ways, in which the saving of souls is confidently included.

In the second place, the becoming-actual-ness of the creaturely is a striving which is not only towards, but also "in the presence of" God (unendliche Streben *zu* Gott und u. S. *vor* Gott). Deity is not the apex of a process, so that the highest grade in the process proximates to or is identical with Deity (Alexander). Process is undeniable, but in the evolution of the creaturely from fire-mist to mind, from raw matter to pure spirit, the entire hierarchy of stages is at every point the whole of it in the highest degree near to Deity, and the similitude of Deity. God is indeed the Pure Spirit-Personality, yet He is mirrored even in the atom. He is comprehended by all, yet free over all. Thus even the similitude of spiritual personality does not exhaust the attributes of Divine Being, and is, perhaps, not the highest similitude; for the essence of Deity lies *beyond* even what we call the spiritual. Evolutionary process is not Deity, but is *in* Deity, who reigns over it and in it and is immeasurably beyond it. He is, in fact, so to speak, Super-spiritual and Super-personal.

This furnishes two consequences. First, the oscillation in

---

maintaining that surrender is going necessarily to bring worldly prosperity—Deuteronomic blessings. That is impossible in the universe as it has been created. The cross is everyone's portion; Buchmanism stops at Cæsarea Philippi and cries with Peter, "Be it far from Thee, Lord." Surrender in a universe of finite free-wills entails sharing the voluntary suffering of the God Who pleases not Himself, and this leads, not to riches and plenteousness, but to the joy that is set before us whereby we endure the suffering, and to the peace that the world cannot give.

Catholic piety between the conception of God as personal and impersonal. On the one hand, we have the naïve petitionary prayer of the peasant, addressed to a mild patriarch, anthropically conceived; and, on the other, the astringent piety of Loyola, with its surrender to the inscrutable decrees of the Divine Majesty, Which is beyond definition, and yet fulfils Its purpose in every event: and these stand in a balanced tension. Second, the essential meaning of Trinitarian doctrine. This has nothing to do with a numerical "one" and "three," since in the utterance of the word "three" it is somehow implied that God is "multiplex," a thing which is contradicted by His Unity (*una substantia*). Hence, the essential meaning of Trinity is the condition of being beyond comprehension. Trinitarian doctrine is, as it were, merely the *grammar* of the language in which, with the greatest reverence, we dare to speak of the Mystery of Mysteries. It is the clearest acknowledgment of the *Deus incomprehensibilis*, Who gives tokens of Himself upon the utmost periphery of the creaturely, only in order to transcend utterly and immeasurably these feeblest of all tokens.

If, then, we consider the creation of the entire universe as the "*processio Dei ad extra*" (which, by the way, is remarkably close to Toyohiko Kagawa's phrase, "The entire universe is God's word") it is possible to see what is meant by the Incarnation of Deity. On two conceptions, God-in-the-flesh is impossible: either that on which He is *within* the creaturely as the immanent Absolute of creation, or that on which He is in direct relationship exclusively to the apex of creation. In the former case, Deity and creation are already fused together, and the Divine is everywhere in general and nowhere in particular. In the latter, Deity can only be directly related to pure spirit. But on the true principle of the *analogia entis* the whole cosmos is "open towards" Deity, and not least in its hierarchical system, ranging from dead matter to pure spirit. The creature in its totality is the window whereby, in the likeness which transcends all likeness, we see into the Being of Deity Who is beyond all comparisons. It is, therefore, receptive and ready to be used by Him, and in its ultimate essence it re-echoes the words: "Behold the handmaid of the Lord: be it unto me according to Thy word." The ἐφ'ἅπαξ Incarnation of Deity in the historical Jesus is thus *the crown of the process of the gracious self-limitation of Deity*. "Creature" is not a limit imposed upon Deity from outside Himself. That is impossible. There *is* no outside to impose it on Him, otherwise He would not be Deity. The creaturely is the (possibly temporary) self-imposed limit which Deity in love has set to His absolute power, and of this the Cross of Our Lord is the *climax*.

Przywara then leads us on to the consideration of the way in which the foregoing principles illuminate our human experiences of free-will, sin, grace, the two natures of Christ, the divine and human elements in the Church, and the ultimate destiny of souls.

Individual existence unveils itself as arising through and in the movement of God Himself. He remains God (pure "Is"), and yet the creature proceeds from Him (as "that which becomes"); but this is not a self-dialectic of Deity (*processio Dei ad intra*), as with Hegel, but a dialectic of God hitherwards (*ad extra*), so that the antithesis between Act of God and Act of Man lies *within* the kingdom of God Himself. Przywara here devotes some space to an exposition of the relation of natural to supernatural endowment, in which he balances the decrees of the Council of Orange against those of the Tridentine and the Vatican Councils, shewing that in the continuous life of the Latin communion both the objective status of the creature as "movement of God hitherward" and its subjective attitude of complete surrender and abandonment to God have been duly emphasized. In order to understand the true relation of God and man one must, says Przywara, take into account the treatment by the Church of Pelagianism on the one hand, and of Baianism and Jansenism on the other. As truly as Deity can never cease to be Deity, and creature creature, so truly every descent of Deity into the creature, however penetrating, and every elevation of the creature to God, however lofty and sublime, always and of necessity remains within the limits of the ultimate tension of "likeness-unlikeness," which eternally prevails between Deity and creature, and which is the fundamental basis of the *analogia entis*.

The almost ecstatic language in which the Greek fathers (and, for that matter, some of the medieval mystics) speak of the "deification" of the child of God breaks off into the abashed reverence (εὐλάβεια) in the Presence of the incomprehensible God Who surpasses all understanding and dwells in light unapproachable. However deeply God may immerse Himself (hypostatically) to be a partaker in human nature, yet throughout all this similarity there runs the unbridgable and ultimate dissimilarity.* The quiet joy of the synoptic Gospels over the simple and homely humanity of the Lord is hushed into silence in the solemn adoration of the Johannine Gospel before the Presence of the Majesty of the Son of God.

And so the form of the orthodox Christian solution in all

* It will be seen that Karl Barth is only emphasizing one pole of this tension when he writes: "There are no bloodvessels through which the life of God overflows into our life" (*von Christlichen Leben*, 1926, p. 38).

these problems (of natural and supernatural, of grace and free-will, of inspiration and incarnation, of discovery and revelation, of mysticism and theophany), which are all internally connected, is ever the same—*i.e.*, neither fusion of the antitheses, nor the annihilation of one by the other, but the mystery of their tension. The "two unfused as one" of classical Christology is pre-eminently the form taken by the solution of these problems in general. In the problem of Our Lord's Personality the "two unfused" is seen "as one" in the one Christ; in the problem of the Church the "two unfused" on the side of God is represented by the invisible Church, on its human side by the visible Church; and, finally, in the problem of Grace and Freedom the "two unfused" is seen in the rigid sense as the twofold aspect of the religious life which concerns (1) supernatural divine grace, (2) active human freedom, both united "as one" in the individual Christian as "Christ in me" and "I as a member of the body of Christ." Creatureliness is throughout *not cancelled* (aufgehoben, a good Hegelian term), *but consecrated.*

Przywara stresses the consequences of this in the specific features of Catholicism as (i.) metaphysical, (ii.) exclusive. The *analogia entis* bespeaks not the construction of a concept of Deity by the creature, so much as the understanding of the creature by means of a prior consideration of Deity. It is not possible to *deduce* all the content of religion from a so-called "first principle," but only to *understand* the given content as pervaded by a single structural principle. And so orthodox Christian theology is metaphysical because it is essentially concerned with a super-creational Deity. Again, since the proper content of religion is determined fundamentally by the idea of the relation between the creaturely and Deity which is based on the principle *analogia entis*, so only can that religion be the *true* religion in which this relationship (which neither confounds God in creation nor creation in God) is preserved. Such religion must be the proper common world-religion; and every man who takes the right standpoint in this matter—*i.e.*, he who makes the act of surrender to God the fundamental religious act of his life—stands at any rate in embryo within this one and only true religion, not as though he by such an act were coercing God into doing what *he* wants, but in that (corresponding to the fundamental nature of the *analogia entis*) he places himself by this fundamental act within the movement from God hitherward, in which the creature lives and moves and has its being.

I take it that Przywara is throughout very conscious of the theology of Neo-Protestantism, and is endeavouring to shew that Catholicism possesses already all that is fundamental to it. Certainly it seems difficult to see in what way the doctrine just

enunciated differs from that of "Gehorsam" and *sola fide*. The differences between Rome and non-Romans lie perhaps elsewhere, in dubious (semi-popular) features, possibly accommodations to a petty-minded and ignorant laity, which are not of the essence of Catholicism, and might be surrendered without loss of principle; in what Fr. Jerome has called "its wonderful accuracy in things unknowable, and its amazing measurements of things immeasurable";* and again in the assumption that during the three centuries of disruption, one (albeit the largest) of the disrupting communities has inevitably and precisely travelled upon the right path, without suffering any spiritual loss through the severance in fellowship from other Christian bodies, an assumption the falsity of which must be evident as soon as it is stated.

The final section of Przywara's essay consists of a sketch illustrating the working out of the principle of tension-in-unity within the limits of historic Christian theology. Only a brief account of this is possible within the limits of the present paper. Six phases are indicated. First, that of the Old Testament, in which the terrifying conception of Deity as the totality of value, activity, and reality is balanced against bridal love between the Lord of the Covenant and His people, so that, on the one hand, we have the inscrutable majesty of the Lord God, and on the other pious intimacy of "Yahwe and His people." The still stronger affirmation of the individual soul and its worth which we see in the Wisdom literature leads on to the *second* phase, that of the New Testament, where we get the antithetical contrast between the God Who so loved the world, and Who shone forth in the countenance of Jesus Christ, Who has numbered the very hairs of one's head, and is addressed in the words of the Lord's Prayer ("God *in* Creation," and "Christ my life"), and the apocalyptic vision of the Throne rising like a second dawning of the vision of Isaiah; between the Rule of God, subjugating the entire natural world, and the mild and humane friendliness of the third Gospel; between the opposition of God to "the world" in the Johannine literature, and the cool terrestrial character exhibited by the proverbial philosophy of the pastoral epistles.

Passing from this revelation-in-tension, as we see it expressed and communicated to us in the literature of the Bible, we come to the variations upon it in the sequence of Christian experience. Here the first phase is that of the Greek fathers, with their fundamental thought of the religious life as "deification" or

* I am thinking especially of the whole system of celestial insurances which centres round the ideas of purgatory and indulgences, and invocation of as many saints as possible; obvious survivals of a sub-Christian religion of fear.

"participation in Deity." This makes man to be concerned with the *telos* of a blessed apotheosis, achieved through the *apatheia* produced by contemplation and by an *askesis* gradually mortifying the human and earthly for the sake of future blessedness, and ending in the *anapausis* of reposeful and complete absorption in the Beatific Vision of the life to come. This form of piety ultimately petrifies itself into the "unchangeable Liturgy" of the Eastern Church. The individuality of the creature is here reduced to a minimum, that of passive participation, and Deity is almost "the All-in-All." In sharp contrast to this is the mysticism of St. Augustine, who, while still proclaiming the doctrine of participation, reacts against the notion of *apatheia*, or gradual release from the process of life, and puts in its place the genuine glowing emotion of love, born of reverence, which adores God from afar, substituting for the physical participation of the Greek fathers a consciously moral one. Yet just as the idea of aloofness is present, from the Greek fathers to St. John of the Cross, so conversely in Augustine the idea of distance is balanced by that of reverent affection leading to intimacy. Augustine is the parent of that piety which is known as *discretio* (*i.e.*, mild moderation which keeps its feet planted firmly on the earth, because it discerns between God and creation). The theology of the Benedictine order is essentially Augustinian rather than Thomist, patristic rather than scholastic, and its piety is that freer and more humane piety of the "Head and body one Christ" which makes the whole of life, from manual labour to the work of the scriptorium, from science to missionary activity, the family service of the one family of Christ. The Civitas Dei, which, in the type represented by the Greek fathers, bears almost wholly otherworldly features, acquires in our second type that terrestrial form which inevitably reached its zenith in the Holy Roman Empire of the German nation, and has the Benedictine "familia" as the germ of its realization. Yet even in Augustine the basic term is "participation." Even his "fearing love and loving fear" is in the last resort passive.

In Aquinas, on the contrary, a different type of analogy prevails, represented by the two phrases "causality" and "secondary causes." Although the Creation is *processio Dei ad extra*, movement from God hitherward, in which the keyword is *causalitas*, yet Aquinas equally proclaims that that which is from God hitherward is *other than* God, and so is individually real and individually active. In this manifold individuality it is a qualitative reflection of the infinity of God.

The system of thought developed by Aquinas forks after his time into that of his own immediate followers, Thomists

proper, with their strong emphasis upon the individual reality of the creature balanced by the thought of the creaturely as the general or universal, the *ordo metaphysicus* which is the eternal *processio Dei*; and that of the Scotists, for whom analogy of being gives way to univocality* of being. This antithesis appears to contradict root and branch the unity of all Catholic modes of stating the doctrine of the *analogia entis*. But Scotists always assert that the antithesis does not concern itself with the essence of reality, but only with the conception of essence. For them real essence also is "analogous"—*i.e.*, there is a permanent tension between Deity as completely real and creation as individually real, between Essence of Being and essence of becoming, even though we can construct an approximately "univocal" conception of essence, in order to compare Deity and creation with one another. This means that the Thomist axiom of the constant immediate correspondence of thought to reality is "aufgehoben," and in the extremer Occamist form of Scotism thought is not direct perception, but only a *presumption* of reality. For Scotism, God is Absolute Will rather than Absolute Being, and the *analogia entis* is one of mutual interpenetration of a God of Will and a universe of wills. But the ordinances of this Absolute Will can only be noted, they cannot be completely apprehended; while over its possibilities there is spread an impenetrable obscurity, to such a degree that in Occamism truth and morality are but functions of a purely arbitrary Divine Will (this is almost Moslem).

The fourth or Scotist type of analogia, then, has special regard for the *particular*, as against the Thomist, with its equally strong regard for the *general*. This proclamation of the qualitative character of the individual finds its explicit form in the subsequent writings of Molina, Suarez, and Newman. Further, the Thomist standpoint inspires essentially the theology and the liturgical piety of the Dominican order, whose aim is to guard the sacred universal Truth, and whose worship is the adoration of universal Truth; while the Scotist standpoint is present in the traditional piety and teaching of the Franciscans, with their emphasis upon the relation of impotent finitude to Divine omnipotence—a theology of cradle and cross, in which the utter feebleness of the human is a token of the nearness of the Almighty God Who makes all the wisdom of man appear as foolishness. It is no accident that St. Francis is the originator of the cultus of the crèche (Greccio, 1223), and his "fooling" is the mysticism of the foolishness of the Cross.

Przywara digresses here to point out how the "sin-mysticism" of the Protestant reformers has its root in Scotism, in the

* Having one meaning only.

utter abasement of the creature through its consciousness of guilt, which is a token of the beginning of being "rapi," laid hold of by the all-efficacious omnipotent God of Grace. Scotism signifies the proclamation of the unsearchableness of God and of the poverty-stricken impotence of all human attempts to confine this unsearchableness within clear limits. He obviously means us to infer that the Lutheran standpoint reaffirmed by the Barthians is only an exaggeration and a break-away into separated existence of a standpoint which is already represented in Catholic theology, but is there held in tension with, and balanced by the clear, calm thought of Thomism.

Indeed, he pursues the comparison in the following terms:

"As the Franciscan order, in marked distinction from the more scientific esoteric character of the Dominican order, is the people's order *κατ ἐξοχήν*, and therefore the order which affirms the small, the evanescent, the transient; so also is its official doctrine, in distinction from Thomism, the decisive origin of a theology and a philosophy which are conditioned by history. Thomism and Scotism are from now onwards within the span of the one *analogia entis*, the two fertile poles of intellectualism and voluntarism, rationalism and positivism, determinism and indeterminism (*i.e.*, so far as the *true* kernel of these isms is in question, and not their mutual exclusiveness as forms)."

The type of *analogia entis* doctrine found respectively in Molina, Suarez, and in Newman is only a further development of the same construction. The fundamental tensions remain the same, but "the particular variation consists in this, that the more the fundamental Scotist idea works itself out, the more it decomposes; so that the erstwhile Thomism comes itself to take a Scotist colour, while conversely the Thomist elements at the Scotist pole cross over."

This later Jesuit scholasticism is so little known to Anglicans that I am sorry to have so little space for it. Briefly, Molina and Suarez founded a school (named after the first of these two Spanish thinkers, Molinism), in which the "analogia attributionis" is significant—*i.e.*, a certain partition of the comprehensibility and incomprehensibility of Deity, whereby there is posited a something *in* God which allows itself to be comprehended, as well as conversely something which is incomprehensible, and God is therefore the Ipsum Esse or Pure Being, Who in the clarity of Thought+Idea and in the obscurity of free volition is One. Thomism was affected by this, and came between the sixteenth and eighteenth centuries to shift its accent on the definition of Deity from the perception to the will. God does not primarily perceive the world-order and then will it, but He wills the world-order and consequently perceives it. Molinism, however, emphasizes creaturely freedom, Thomism

Divine omnipotence, so that Bañez (1528-1604) lays tremendous emphasis upon the omnipotence of Grace, while Molinism takes up the Thomist idea of *causæ secundæ* and shapes it into emphasis upon the specific reality, effectiveness, and value of the creaturely. This fifth type of *analogia entis* doctrine, thus furnished by Molinism, is the philosophy of the Jesuit order, and has its liturgical expression in Ignatian piety and spiritual exercises.

Przywara thus claims to place Newman at the end of a kind of genealogical table, Augustine<Aquinas<Molina-Suarez<Newman; and he regards the interpretation of the latter by Brémond and Loisy as Pseudo-Newman, holding that the true development from the thought of the nineteenth-century cardinal is to be found in two mutually opposed but really complementary forms of present-day neo-scholasticism, the one in which a rigid reflex-deductive intellectualism is potent, the other in which the perception of the world falls back upon the Augustinian formula "homo abyssus" (man fundamentally a riddle), and so also returns to the other Augustinian formula "si comprehendis, non est Deus," which is renewed in Thomism as "cognitio Dei tanquam ignoti." Thus once again the doctrine of God so familiar to students of Barth is found *within* Catholicism, yet held in conjunction with and balanced by a more rationalistic type of thought.

"There is," says Przywara, "a certain cool and almost irresolute attitude pervading this sixth type of *analogia entis* doctrine, the attitude of a humanity overburdened with experience and disillusionment, still more autumnal than the Molinist type. But, perhaps, the whole secret of the *analogia entis* was never so equally visible and tangible as in it: an unheard-of sensitiveness to every distinction of the individual, combined with a painful sensitiveness to the bewildering multiplicity of finite forms; and yet also the complete ardour of the Augustinian search for God in timorous reverence, which goes almost too far in its reticence regarding the Being and work of God. Augustine on the summit of the ancient world, Aquinas on the crown of the Middle Ages, Newman in the heyday of nineteenth-century liberal optimism, find themselves in that same autumnal ripeness of old age which accompanies exaltation—sunset upon Nebo!"

These six types of *analogia entis*, according to Przywara, ultimately reduce themselves to two:

(i.) Christian-platonic, with Augustine as its master, in so far as he differs from Aquinas and inclines in the direction of the Easterns. This type affirms God as All, and yet because God is the Essence or Summary of the world, affirms the comprehensible nearness of God.

(ii.) Christian-Aristotelian, with Aquinas as its classic instance and zenith. This type affirms the reality of the

creaturely, yet, just because in so doing it recognizes the distinction between God and the world, it also affirms the incomprehensible aloofness of God.

These two types are themselves in tension with one another, and with complementary and antithetical elements within themselves. The structural law of the *analogia entis* combines them into a unity.

Just at this point I am not quite sure about Przywara's nomenclature. He seems quite right in reducing the types to two, but I am not certain whether he is wise in labelling the one Augustinian and the other Thomist. However, perhaps it is best to let his argument run out to its finish.

The Augustinian type sees the creation as pre-eminently the Being and Activity of the Creator, as Divine idea. The Thomist type sees it as other than the Creator, and realizes that since God created that which was other than Himself, He created therewith the possibility of sin, and so "permits" actual sin; but this type is nevertheless not daunted by sinfulness, but displays a tranquil self-possession, rejoicing in the beauty and the goodness of the world, despite their limitations, and knowing how to endure its sin, despite an undiminished consciousness of its guilt. Yet the Augustinian type finds a (so-to-speak) secularized creation in evidence, and therefore lays emphasis upon the formula "God is all." It is the type of continuous religious regeneration, while the Thomist type is that of religious fruition. The Augustinian type produces a piety which is expressed in the "desiderium aeterni sabbati," desire and longing to be absorbed in God. The Thomist type centres upon the formula of "good sense," and upon doing all to the glory of God, or, as Eckhart and Loyola have put it, upon "finding God in all things." For the Augustinian type, so well illustrated by the famous vision at the end of the ninth book of the *Confessions*, worship is a "dwelling in the Heavenlies," in which creature-consciousness is almost extinguished. For the Thomist type, worship is the modest and reverent service of God upon earth, in which we "fulfil in our body that which is lacking in the sufferings of Christ," a worship of service in daily tasks and daily sacrifice. The Augustinian type stresses "life in God" (which in the extreme Eastern form becomes "cultus *as* God"). The Thomist type stresses "service in the presence of God." Again, the Augustinian type treats the cosmos as the whole circular movement of the Love of God, whereby that Love draws the cosmos irresistibly into Itself. It is almost as though "resistance" were the only genuine activity of the cosmos, while the actual *striving onward* (becoming-actual-ness) appears to be the pure motion of the Love of God

("God as All"). For the Thomist type on the other hand, this circular motion is the love of the creation manifested towards God, for which, indeed, the motion of the Love of God is the "causa prima," but not the sole mover, since all "Streben" is true activity, positive as well as negative. In the more intellectualist schools of Thomism God becomes almost the tranquil spectator or Judge of the process, wherein the creation unfolds itself before Him ("the creature as real").

From these two fundamental types, as their permutations and variations, all other types of religious philosophy have arisen. But the only satisfactory and stable philosophy is that which holds the two as opposites, and not as contradictions, in a stable tension-in-unity—"a freely-swinging poise," so Przywara puts it, "the poise of the entire creaturely before God as the revelation of the super-creaturely God, the concrete Deity in-over the concrete totality of the creation"—maintained right through the sequence of the natural order up to the (einmalige, or once-for-all) Incarnation.

For the Augustinian type the relation of body to spirit is one of "process" (von weg zu). It is a flight into God. Nature merges into humanity, and humanity, as Eckhart says, is "the candle of God," the almost unsubstantial hem of the cloud that conceals the Eternal Brightness.

For the Thomist type the body-spirit complex ever remains creaturely, even when endowed with grace; and even man without grace and tainted by sin remains "unum ens," and not less than human.

And so the Augustinian type sees in the Incarnation the exaltation of human nature into the Divine, the Thomist the descent of the Divine into human nature; the one is a spiritualizing of the corporeal, the other a corporealizing of the spiritual.

In the Thomist view of the Church, the community preserves and enriches the individual. The Augustinian view removes the redeemed soul out of the bondage of earthly fellowship "into God." Hence, Thomism stresses the visible, Augustinianism the invisible Church.

For the Augustinian type God is the "Absolute" of Personality, for the Thomist He is that which is symbolized in the tension "Individual-Community," and so is the Super-Personal. This naturally conditions the view held regarding the Triune Godhead.

The co-existence of these two types within Christianity bespeaks an *oscillation* between naturalism and spiritualism, between individualism and universalism, between the Eastern and the Western mind, between "God is All" and "the creature as real." The tension Platonism-Aristotelianism is released

into the tension Augustinianism-Thomism, as the historically concrete form of the one *analogia entis*.

In answer to the question, "Is Religion Act of God or Act of Man?" and the further question, "Is Religion in any real sense possible?" the historic Christian answer of the Church universal keeps completely outside the fabric of the problem as stated by non-Christians. According to the doctrine of analogy, the creation is Movement of God hitherward, and in this Movement of God the hitherward trend involves the emergence of an "other than God." In other words, because the whole creation is wholly "out of Deity," there is no dilemma in origin between Divine Act and Creaturely Act, as between two equally authorized and independent entities standing over against each other, but all true independence ("Eigen") in the creature is "from God hitherward," so that the apparent dilemma is the mystery of God the Creator, the Self-Existent Being Himself. This makes it evident that the apparently insoluble Entweder-oder between complete supranaturalism and complete rationalism, between Act of God and Act of Man, which cuts across the discussion of the problem of existence in all its parts, is in reality only the troubled shadow cast by the basic problem with which Catholic philosophy is concerned: Unity or Duality of nature and super-nature, of Grace and freedom. The creature is wholly in God's hands, but in God's hands wholly as creature.

Now the two historical types of Christian thought emphasize respectively the one or the other pole of this tension. The Augustinian sees the unity between the two as "given," the Thomist as due to "surrender." The one sees man's union with God as "rescue," the other as "transfiguration."

The last two paragraphs of the essay are best quoted at length:

"The thought of 'outgoing' and 'return,' and so of 'rotation,' is for both Eastern and Western philosophies the last word of wisdom. The creation as the rotation of the Divine Life is the dream of Eastern wisdom, from Indian and Chinese philosophy to the more definitely declared form of religious metaphysic which occurs in Plato. The philosophy of the Augustinian type now makes response to this in its ultimate thought of the *processio Dei ad intra* (the rotation of the Divine life) as being united with the *processio Dei ad extra* (the rotation of the creaturely life) in one *processio Dei*. The creation as a circular motion, self-contained, appears, on the other hand, as the final thought of Western wisdom, with its classic expression in the Aristotelian cosmos of eternal movement. To this corresponds the philosophy of the Thomist type: the distinctness of the *processio Dei ad intra* (God as *over* the world) and the distinctness of the *processio Dei ad extra* (the world as relative to God in its self-contained movement) are merged in the distinction between the 'ad intra' and 'ad extra.' But since the Augustinian and

the Thomist types in their mutual relations only exhibit the concrete form of a religious philosophy based upon the *analogia entis*, upon the single principle of 'separateness from Deity *in* likeness to Him,' the antithetical fabric of the world-wisdom of East and West is in them redeemed and brought to the unity of the Una Catholica.

"And so appears evident that meaning of Catholicity . . . as 'God all in all,' yet on that account (since all that is creaturely is 'from God hitherward') Catholicity also in the human sense as 'all in all *related to* God,' and that is the essential positive meaning of the axiom 'extra ecclesiam nulla salus.'"

I much regret that it appears impossible at present, at any rate, to provide a complete English translation of this interesting treatise, the purport of which cannot here be given in detail; but it seems important in the interests of a wider Christian unity that its main thesis should be known and considered—*i.e.*, that the Augustinianism of Lutheran theology is incomplete in separation from its opposite pole, Thomism, and that therefore a full Christianity must be roomy enough to hold the two together. Is it possible that there is a better opportunity for the Communio Anglicana to do this than for the Communio Romana?

There will, I am sure, be some who feel that Przywara minimizes the fact of sin. If they do, it is partly because I have had to leave out of consideration the many passages in which he speaks of it quite as positively as (let us say) Brunner. But, of course, the answer to the critic who says, "Analogia entis? But why on this basis should not the act of murder be an imperfect analogy of something in the Divine life?" is that in the "processio Dei ad extra" *that* which emerges is "other than Deity," and sin, failure to surrender, or rebellion against the "processio Dei ad intra," is not primary, but a perversion of that "other" due to its gift of "otherness." It finds no counterpart in the interior life of Deity, which is wholly good and wholly perfect in all its richness, fulness, and completeness.

One is loth to criticize. There is just a suspicion of rationalization when Przywara comes to speak about the Vatican decree of infallibility; and I am not sure what he means by "primeval man" when he is speaking of humanism. But in the main I am conscious of a really great issue being set before us by him, in facing which Anglicans and Romans can unite to consider the things whereon as Christian theists they are agreed, and I am also conscious that he displays a spirit which (without misunderstanding, I hope) may be judged more Anglican than Roman, in its broad and appreciative handling of the message of the Old and New Testament Scriptures.

A. C. Bouquet.

(*Stanton Lecturer, Cambridge*, 1931-34.)

EMOTIONAL SCEPTICISM

THE tendency of popular religion to become sentimental has always aroused the anxiety of seriously-minded theologians, but it sometimes seems as though the energy of their protests has driven these defenders of the faith to an undue undervaluation of the place of the emotions in the good life, an undervaluation which is analogous to scepticism in the intellectual sphere. The consideration of this possibility was recently brought to a point in the writer's mind by a correspondence in which he engaged with a young Anglo-Catholic priest who will be referred to as M.

M. had been reading Dr. W. B. Selbie's *Religion and Life*, and wrote in criticism of it as follows:

"I do not think it wise to lay so much stress on the 'felt' element in religion. Perhaps that is because there is little more than the purely emotional in my own experience of religion. I find that the emotions enkindled by a hymn or a sermon or during Mass can be kindled in me by the cinema, the drama, or even a novel. And that is why I do not think we should lay emphasis, as he does, on the religious instinct. However, I suppose that for a while theologians will continue to overvalue the subjective element in religion. I suppose that Protestantism always has done in a way. Protestants usually label a conscientious attention to religious duty hypocrisy. But I think that there is a great deal to be said for 'strengthening the things that remain.'

"I believe that many Protestants cannot see why Catholic-minded priests will say their offices dutifully even though they do not 'feel moved' to it. I remember A. saying to me that he had fits of praying. I think a Protestant would approve of that and would condemn as a hypocrite one who deliberately spent a quarter of an hour on his knees using formal prayers because he did not 'feel' moved to pray. I know a man who argues in that way. He believes a preacher to be true if he moves him to tears. But if the preacher does not move him in this way he doubts the preacher's sincerity or truth. This attitude is by no means uncommon. Result—people give up their prayers and their communions because they do not *feel* any benefit. And they condemn those who persist in religious exercises even though they no longer have any felt attraction to them. . . .

"When you find a Protestant who persists in the performance of religious duties even though he no longer 'enjoys' them, then you can say that that Protestant is really a sheep in wolf's clothing!"

Several interesting points are here raised. The remarks on Protestantism need not be taken too seriously, since spiritual deformities are more clearly discernible in those whose religious allegiance differs from our own. Thus it is no uncommon thing for Protestants to accuse Catholics of a shallow sentimen-

talism, for, as George Santayana observes, Catholic piety seems to the Protestant an æsthetic indulgence, a religion appealing to sense, for such is the only emotion it can awaken in him, unused as he is to a supernatural economy reaching down into the incidents and affections of daily life. While, therefore, M. goes too far in saying that the Protestant would stigmatize the conscientious performance of religious duties as hypocrisy, it would not be untrue to say that much Protestant suspicion of formal prayers and ceremonial is grounded in the conviction that ceremonial acts, such as, for example, genuflection, cannot on each occasion of their performance be accompanied by the appropriate emotional tone which is, in the Protestant view, necessary to guarantee their sincerity.

More significant is the thorough-going distrust of the emotions in the religious sphere. Is that wholly justified? M. is suspicious because of the similarity of what passes for religious emotion to emotion that to all appearance comes from quite a different source. But emotions are not easily commensurable. Is it precisely the same kind of emotions that are awakened by plays, novels, films as by assistance at the Holy Communion or hearing hymns or sermons? The difficulty is to find any kind of moral litmus paper to dip into them.

And even if the emotions are the same, will they be aroused by any play, any novel, any film? May there not be some spiritual quality in the "secular" source of emotion that produces the effect? And, also, the effect is not produced on any and every person. Here again the difficulty of comparing emotions arises, but it is probable that the thrill that M. gets from plays, films, and novels is not the same as that which is enjoyed by those of his neighbours who do not share his faith. The spiritual quality which differentiates those particular sources of emotion will be most easily discernible by those who have more certain contacts with things spiritual than are to be looked for in the patronage of such entertainments. As a Roman Catholic writer has said, the supernatural character of our inner life does not necessarily modify the psychological pattern of that life; even when it does modify, it is not by violently introducing into it completely foreign elements, but rather in helping, completing, raising that which already constitutes our natural psychic activity.*

A large part of our psychic activity concerns our relations with other human beings, and these relations commonly bear an emotional colouring. Is this emotional colouring to be regarded as a kind of secondary quality, in the Lockian sense, of

* Fr. Guibert, *Revue d'Ascétique et Mystique*, January, 1920, p. 18. *Cf.* comment by H. Bremond in *Prière et Poésie*, p. 87.

these relations? And, if so, is it to be considered as at best of minor importance, at worst a source of error both intellectual and moral?

Such a view is traceable in the ethical theory of Kant, who takes as the highest type of moral action the continual doing good to someone whom we heartily hate all the time. There is an air of unreality about this that strikes chill on the moral consciousness of the ordinary man, and it is also too one-sided. Kant ought at least to have attributed some kind of passive merit to the object of such a frosty benevolence if he contrived to accept it more gracefully than it was offered!

So thorough-going a distrust of the emotions is a form of scepticism. You cannot eliminate sensibility from the moral and religious life any more than you can eliminate sensation from the intellectual. If the emotions aroused in us by the contemplation of good or bad, kind or unkind actions are to be entirely discounted, the result is the introduction of a kind of dualism into our moral and spiritual life as fruitful of difficulties as that which would sever the world of sense from the world of thought. The things that are felt may indeed be temporal, but, no less than the things that are seen, they bear the impress of the faith, hope, and charity that abide. We can, if we act promptly, find our way to a friend by the footprints he has left in the sand, even though the next tide will wash those footprints away. There was a short-lived tumult one day outside the gates of Jericho. It was soon forgotten by the crowd, but to blind Bartimæus, who was not content merely with being thrilled, but acted on his impulse, it meant restored vision and a new life.

If, then, we find emotion so deeply wrought into our human relationships, why should it be suspect in our intercourse with Divine personality? Simply because of the ever-present danger that emotion may run to seed, in sentimentality, which has been defined as an artificial stimulation or prolongation of emotion, a keeping alive of a feeling whose vitality is exhausted, or as enjoyment without obligation. The Shorter Catechism of the Westminster divines is an austere enough document in all conscience, but it begins by telling us that man's chief end is to glorify God and to enjoy Him for ever. The enjoyment here contemplated is most certainly not enjoyment without obligation, but is it to be passionless?

Let St. Thomas Aquinas have the last word. He says that it adds to the goodness of a good act that it should be done *passionately*—that is, with joy, enthusiasm, and desire—provided always that the motive is no mere wave of passing emotion. Emotion (passion) can stand in a double relation to the decision of [right] reason. It can precede it; and in that respect it may

cloud the decision of reason (on which depends the moral goodness of the act), and so diminish its worth. For example, an act of charity performed deliberately is more praiseworthy than one performed out of the emotion of pity alone. But emotion can also be consequent upon the decision of the will, and this again in two ways: (*a*) as an epiphenomenon ("per modum redundantiæ")—*e.g.*, when the higher part of the soul is intensely moved in a particular direction, and sways the (emotions or) lower part in the same direction—in such a case emotion consequent upon the decision of the will is evidence of its greater intensity, and so proves greater moral worth; (*b*) as chosen by right reason—*e.g.*, when a man deliberately and of right reason submits himself to the sway of an emotion, so that by the co-operation of his sensitive appetite he may act the more eagerly. In this case also emotion adds to the moral worth of the action.*

J. S. MacArthur.

THE NOËLS OF EMILE CAMMAËRTS

The Noëls of Emile Cammaërts are among the things of beauty and joys for ever. To those who have felt their sweet intimate appeal, Christmas would be incomplete without their message. It is crystal clear as the haunting Bethlehem motif of Bach, who, of all composers, wafts us nearest to the starlit plain of miracles. There, the shepherds "chatting in a rustic row"—and they alone—heard amazed the first Gloria in excelsis of which the sonorous music of a million Christmases is only a poor echo.

For Emile Cammaërts has recaptured the long-lost stark simplicity of the earliest Noëls, irradiated with the faith of those who "believe nor question how." It is true they are not written in our own language. It is true, unhappily, that in a most painstaking translation something of their wild-flower fragrance vanishes. In the original they suggest the sainfoin, that holy hay which, according to a Breton legend, blossomed in the manger to make a rosy couch for the divine Babe.

Many of their legion admirers here are quite unaware that these lovely Noëls are all English born, having been written in England between 1900 and 1916 in unique circumstances. For

* *Summa Theologica*, i., 2, *q.* 24, *a.* 3, quoted and commented on by K. E. Kirk in *The Vision of God*, p. 384.

they are the precious Christmas gift of a poet who was baptized into the English branch of the Catholic Church at St. Cuthbert's, Earl's Court, and is at one with us in communion and fellowship. These golden links with ourselves make even a cursory glance interesting at this renaissance of what has been mourned as a lost art even in Belgium, one of its cradles.

For Monsieur Ernest Closson, an accepted authority on the history and genesis of the Belgian Noël, laments its extinction in a preface to his book upon Noëls and their settings, published in 1909. He was evidently unaware that in the previous year fresh Noëls were beginning to flower—Christmas roses in a cold world of scepticism. In these, this modern poet, whose *Carillon* stirred the heart like a trumpet after what he memorably called "la défaite plus belle que la victoire" of his small valiant country, forgot even war, to tell the old, old story.

"There must be truth on earth, as fresh as in Bethlehem," wrote Disraeli surprisingly, and of this Emile Cammaërts is convinced. To prove how he realizes the joy of religion, one striking contrast suffices. We have but to compare his outlook with the poignant sadness of Hardy, looking back to childhood with an ache of longing for a child's acceptance of the far-flung legend of ox and ass making humble obeisance in what adoring Milton names:

> "The courtly stable, where
> Bright harnessed angels sit in order serviceable."

Hardy—surely in that hour not far from the kingdom of God—says wistfully:

> "So fair a fancy few believe
> In these years! Yet I feel
> If someone said on Christmas Eve,
> 'Come and see the oxen kneel
> In the lonely barton by the coomb
> Our children used to know,'
> I should go with him in the gloom,
> *Hoping it might be so.*"

How differently does Cammaërts see "the meek mild creatures all in their strawy pen." His is the goodly heritage of Franciscan gladness, and here Sister Ass is spokeswoman, and Brother Ox listens to her answers to his questions.

> "*Meuh! fermez la porte, qui vient ici?*
> *Il fait froid, il fait nuit.*
> *Qui vient ici?*"
> "*Ce n'est que nous, une femme—ihan!*
> *Un homme, et bientôt un Enfant.*"
> "*Qu'est-ce qui brille à travers le toit?*
> *Fermez donc la porte.*"
> "*C'est l'Etoile qui s'arrête.*"
> "*Qu'est-ce qui chante là-haut tout bas?*"
> "*C'est le chœur des anges en fête.*"

" Qu'est-ce qui gémit dans la litière ?"
" C'est la Vierge-Mère."
" Qu'est-ce qui remue là-bas ?"
" C'est l'homme qui décharge mon bât."
" Meuh ! et maintenant, mon frère,
N'entends-tu rien, ne vois-tu rien pas terre ?"
" C'est un petit enfant tout nu,
Ihan ! jouant avec ses pieds menus."
" Meuh ! ouvrez la porte, j'entends les pas
Des bergers et des rois
Venus pour l'adorer."
" Ihan ! il fait bon, l'Etoile brille."
" Ouvrez la porte, ouvrez.
L'Enfant rit."

St. Francis would have relished the tale thus told, with its smiling Babe. He was "never sad with our new-fashioned sorrow"; nor is this singer in his Noëls of today. His speech is plain as that of the forgotten author of a Burgundian carol, giving one homely detail he misses.

" Mais le plus beau de l'histoire
Ce fut que l'âne et le bœuf
Ainsi passèrent tout deux
La nuit sans manger ni boire."

Nor does he touch on the charming fancy peculiar to Belgium that the bees woke from their winter torpor to hum round the manger, as if summer had come.

Even a brief survey of those Belgian Noëls of which Monsieur Closson supplies intelligent French translations suffices to prove that Cammaërts is no plagiarist, if there be inevitable analogies.

The earlier Noëls seem ill at ease in their French dress; he, by some magic, gives his French a rare flexibility to suit them. The subjects are, of course, identical: The Nativity, the Adoration of the Shepherds and the Magi, the Massacre of the Innocents, and the Flight into Egypt. Dutch Vondel set the sorrows of Rachael to those tender diminutives our own rich language lacks. Catholic and Calvinist have alike sung of them ever since, to the rocking cadences of that unforgettable tune known as Ruyter's cradle song. The Belgian Noëls followed suit in numbers, painting the horrid scene after the model of Brueghel, with his foreground of soldiers hacking babies to pieces, his background of peasants gaily skating. Here is an example:

" Hérode plein de malice
Se trouvant ainsi trompé
Mit son âme à l'injustice
Comme un diable forcené
Fit décoller les Innocens
A la pointe de l'epée
Dont il sortit hors de sens
Et son âme fut damnée."

Cammaërts never gives us anything like this cautionary moral. Instead, he tells the prettiest of tales of Our Lady seeking a safe

hiding-place for her Child, and asking all the birds to help her. The quail is too busy with her little ones, the turtle doves cannot interrupt their love ditties. The lark alone contrives to mislead the soldiers of Herod with false directions, and saves them. This is why the lark became first among birds, according to the promise of the divine Child Himself.

" Tu sera le premier des oiseaux
Tu vaincras le hibou et le chathuant
Comme je vaincrai la mort."

The youngest can understand it all. It is naïve as the Walloon legend, where a peasant stops sowing his corn in order to conceal the fugitives. By a miracle his meadow is suddenly covered with golden corn when he has obeyed the white-robed lady.

" Marie qui passe le laboureur,
Le laboureur semant le blé.
' Semez-le là, mon bel ami.' "

They hide in a wood, where an obedient nightingale cheers them.

" Chantez, rossignol, pour égayer mon fils."

The birds of Cammaërts are just as natural.

With Belgium from a remote past the battle-field of the world, there is pathos in the frequency with which the Belgian minstrels, whose Noël was expected to be a hardy annual, chose the Flight into Egypt as their subject. Fugitives and exiles were sadly familiar, and again and again do they recur. It was an irony that a living poet should learn all they knew of the pale fear of pursuit, the hot fire of blazing homes.

In *L'Adoration des Soldats* Cammaërts takes us to the trenches of 1915, instead of Egypt. It makes no difference to the reality. " They may be spies," says one of the soldiers. " The ass was lame, and the woman weary," is the excuse of the other for bidding the exiles rest. The oldest Noël does not more surely convey their sudden sense of awe.

" Pourquoi vous mettez-vous à genoux ?"
" C'est pour mieux regarder l'Enfant !"
" Pourquoi découvrez-vous ?"
" Parce que ses petits pieds sont blancs."
" Pourquoi joignez-vous les mains ?"
" Parce que c'est Noël demain."
" Pourquoi restez-vous silencieux ?"
" Pour mieux entendre chanter :
Gloire à Dieu au haut des cieux."

Chocolate and jam, hot soup and beer, milk for the Mother, tobacco for St. Joseph. It matters nothing that half these things are modern when the ancient spirit touches each poor offering with the same celestial radiance.

A great critic said that the poet's Noël takes, perhaps, its clearest and most definite outline in *Les Bergers*. The barest simplicity, the fewest words possible. No trick of phrase, no purple patch, yet a miniature masterpiece. Monsieur Closson says there are "hundreds" of Nativity Noëls in existence. Yet, of those quoted, not one comes near these shepherds of our own time. One of the oldest is unique in bidding shepherdesses go with the shepherds to Bethlehem.

"Accourez filles de Sion;
Rien n'est plus admirable;
Accourez, voir un Dieu poupon
Couché dans un étable."

This came from Liège, now most unromantic of cities. But in the "age of velvet and bright steel," when Quentin Durward was a visitor, there was a popular theatre of marionettes where nativity plays were given at Christmas and every street echoed with the song:

"Quiconque bon Liégois sera
Point de chanter ne se poindre
Noël à grand gorgée."

The "daughters of Sion" seem out of the picture; the three shepherds of Cammaërts make it a reality. They live and move and have their being, and for once this vitality animates quite the happiest of the translations by Madame Cammaërts.

"Three shepherds blowing on three pipes,
Three little pipes with three little stops.
Three little hats and three little crooks,
And the hip and the ho and the lahito.

"Three shepherds with three hundred sheep
Trotting so quietly, breathing low,
The cloud of smoke about their fleece
And the hip and the ho and the lahito.

"The star trembles over a cottage below,
And brown shepherds, russet sheep,
Move towards it through the plain
To the hip and the ho and the lahito.

"What have we got? What have we
To give to the King of land and sea,
With our hip and our ho and our lahito?
The first said, 'I can give my hood.'
The second, 'I can give my gloves.'
The third, 'And I my old pipe good.'"

The last verses compel the original.

"Afin qu'il n'est pas froid aux yeux
Et qu'il ait bien chaud aux mains
Et que, plus tard, au haut des cieux
Il fume avec ses séraphins."

"Ce n'est pas beaucoup, beaucoup—
Au son du po—et c'est tout ce que nous aimons
Autant que notre pip, notre po et notre lahitou."

This spontaneous ease tends to the delusion that any rhymester can imitate. It is just the divine simplicity of which only the true poet ever finds the secret.

Yet of all these, which another critic aptly calls the "birth-day songs of Christ, where tenderness and reverence are mingled in truly medieval fashion," the Noël of the Epiphany is surely the most perfect. English poetry is rich in Epiphany poems. Crashaw, Herrick with his "deare child" offering a flower, Keble, Flecker, Mr. G. K. Chesterton, are some who have brought their gold, frankincense, and myrrh to the infant Saviour. Is it because they are glad at heart to know how soon the wise men —the intellectuals—followed the shepherds? They were led by faith and a single star. Not for them the vision of angels in the firmament of heaven, not for them the unearthly sweetness of the music "while glory shone around." Yet they, too, saw the "King in His beauty" when they came from the land that was very far off.

It is strange that Shakespeare only mentions the word Christmas casually, and only twice. He alludes to the legend that the "bird of dawning singeth all night long," because "so hallowed and so gracious is the time." That is all.

He left it to Milton to sum up all the deepest meaning of Epiphany in one sublime invitation:

"See how from far upon the eastern road,
The star-led wizards haste with odours sweet:
O run, prevent them with thy humble ode
And lay it lowly at his blessed feet;
Have thou the honour first thy Lord to greet
And join thy voice unto the angel quire
From out his secret altar touched with hallowed fire."

The last line stands alone in literature. Our poets have indeed felt the full meaning of Epiphany; yet not one of them has given us a genuine Noël.

The shepherd of the dateless York mystery play comes nearer to it when he says at the manger:

"Lo! he merries,
Lo! he laughs, my sweeting
Have a bob of cherries!"

To Cammaërts alone has been given back that precious simplicity, and when he writes of "The Kings" we go with them and echo their cry of longing:

"Nous avons faim de toi."

Each verse is a picture rich in colours, mysterious with moonlight, set to the crystalline tinkling of the camel bells.

> "*Un son lointain derrière la colline*
> *La colline rousse dans la nuit bleue*
> *L'Etoile en tête la lune en queue*
> *Du tintement des sonnettes crystallines.*"

Then come the camels' heads, necks and humps swaying to the bells.

> "*Un chameau, puis deux, puis trois*
> *L'Etoile en tête, la lune en queue*
> *Trois lourdes bosses et trois grands rois*
> *Drapés d'or et d'argent dans la nuit séreine.*"

Here the translator fails. "Silver and gold on the cold blue snow" does not convey the richness of apparel of the riders "draped" in splendour—Gaspard, Melchior, and Balthazar with his eyes fixed upon the star.

> "We come from the end of the world,
> Cling, clang in the snow,
> Cling, clang in the night,
> Following ever the wandering star,
> And we hunger for thy sight."

We are not shewn the arrival of the kings; in the last verse the *cortège* vanishes behind the hills, and we are left to imagine the rest, and to be haunted by those tinkling bells. There is a strange glamour about this Noël of the wise, the first disciples, after all, who left to follow the gleam. The shepherds were compelled to Bethlehem by the music from on high. The kings —if kings they were—had only their star, their faith, and their hope.

The old English carols have their quaint charm, their warm touches of tenderness. If they be crude and bald at times, they have the root of the matter in their jingling rhymes. Yet at no time was the Noël a recognized part of Christmas, as in Holland, Brittany, and Belgium. Even our carols soon died out. Perhaps the latest echo comes from Nahum Tate in 1670 in the familiar "While shepherds watched their flocks by night." John Byrom, in 1763, sounds a clarion with "Christians, awake," but it is too reflective to be called a Noël.

> "Trace we the Babe who hath redeemed our loss
> From the poor manger to the bitter Cross."

And in "Hark, how all the welkin rings!" Wesley wrote the hymn worthiest to be sung after the *Adeste Fideles*.

It is to Emile Cammaërts the honour belongs of giving us back the Noël perfected, to remind us of the profound spiritual meaning of the Christmas Festival.

One English voice recalls his. It is that of a woman who surrendered her love for her faith. For Christina Rossetti surely became a Noëlist in one sweet moment when she wrote:

> "Only the mother
> In her maiden bliss
> Worshipped the beloved
> With a kiss . . .
> What shall I give him ?
> Poor as I am,
> If I were a shepherd
> I would bring a lamb.
> If I were a wise man
> I would do my part.
> Yet what I can I give him—
> Give my heart."

ROWLAND GREY.

MISCELLANEA

CORRESPONDENCE

"LIBERAL CATHOLICS AND THE INCARNATION"

SIR,

I suppose that Mr. Elmer More will reply to Mr. Pittenger's article in the September number of THEOLOGY. If he does, what follows will be unneeded. But it is dangerous to leave the distinction between Theism and Pantheism in the vagueness with which Mr. Pittenger invests it by his statement on p. 158. On the one hand he writes (quoting Canon Streeter), "Historically the isolation of the divine Sonship of Christ from the potentiality in other men to become sons of God has defeated the attempt to produce a satisfactory doctrine of the Incarnation." He continues, "We may even say (with Chancellor Bezzant) that our Lord is actually what all men are potentially: He is the embodiment of God's purpose for every one of us." On the other hand he adds, "We must guard carefully against a misunderstanding. No attempt is made by liberal Catholics to equate God and man. The two are quite other."

Surely the fundamental distinction between Theism and Pantheism is to be found in Personality. Certainly we believe that God is immanent in the universe; or, to put it in the Scriptural phrase, the universe exists in God: the truer phrase, because it recognizes both the immanence and transcendence of God. Yes, God is in the world; but He is personally distinct from it. God is in man; but man is personally distinct from God. Is Jesus, then, personally distinct from God? A Catholic answers, "No, He is personally God." Others today answer, "He *is* personally distinct from God: we reject His Divine Personality; He is a human person in whom God was immanent to a unique degree." Such persons, if they still call Him God and worship Him, can only do so as Pantheists.

Yours,

G. H. TREMENHEERE.

ST. EDWARD'S HOUSE,
WEST MALVERN.

"STANDING FOR THE PSALMS"

SIR,

In connection with Mr. C. F. Rogers' *catena* of passages in the October issue of THEOLOGY, it may be worth noting that there is strong evidence, based largely on a divergence of Eucharistic doctrine and also considerations of handwriting, for ascribing the First and Third Series of *Notes on the Book of Common Prayer*, printed in vol. v. of Cosin's *Works*, to different authors. While the Third Series are undoubtedly the work of John Cosin, it is probable that the First Series is the work of a Mr. Hayward, a nephew of John Overall (a discussion of the question will be found in the *Guardian* correspondence, September to October 1900). If so, we have a further advocate of "standing for the Psalms.'

In view of Mr. Rogers' suggestion that the writer of the First Series of Notes may have been reading Alardus Gazæus (which surely conceals a good French name, Alard Gazet, and has nothing to do with a native of Gaza !), attention may also be drawn to the fact that the Notes in question were not *printed* until 1710, in William Nicholl's *Comment on the Book of Common Prayer;* 1619, the date to which Mr. Rogers refers, is merely the date of the edition of the Prayer Book in which the written notes were inscribed.

Yours,
F. L. Cross.

Pusey House,
Oxford.

"PRAYER TO THE HOLY SPIRIT"

Sir,

With reference to Dr. Prideaux's article in your October issue on *Prayer to the Holy Spirit*, it may be interesting to remark that Professor Bulgakoff has dealt with the same subject in an article entitled *On Prayer to the Holy Spirit in the Orthodox Church* (*Journal of the Fellowship of St. Albans and St. Sergius*, March, 1934). He remarks that "we do not as a rule pray to the Holy Spirit Himself, but rather about Him, and about His descent upon us," and emphasizes that even in the Orthodox services of Pentecost there is no direct invocation of Him. As the sole exception he mentions the prayer which is, next to the Lord's Prayer, the most frequently used of all Orthodox prayers, and which is, it appears, recited in every Orthodox office. It is as follows:

"O King of Heaven, Thou Comforter, Spirit of Truth, Who art everywhere and fillest all things, Store of good gifts and Giver of Life, come and abide in us, cleanse us from all evil and save our souls, O gracious Lord."

Professor Bulgakoff explains the reticence of the Church in invoking the Holy Spirit by "the fact that in this age, in the Kingdom of Grace, the personal hypostatic face of the Holy Spirit has not, as yet, been revealed to us, but will be disclosed in the Kingdom of Glory that is still to come."

Yours,
E. L. Mascall.

St. Andrew's Vicarage,
Stockwell.

NOTES

THE MEDITATIONS OF A PHILOSOPHER

A Study in Ecclesiastes

Ecclesiastes has been described as an autobiography of a soul. It is the record of the inner travail of a man who tries to find some meaning in life. He looks out upon the world and experiments with one thing after another, but each time his conclusion is "all is vanity." Towards the end of his search for a unifying principle he does begin to see light, and though the full meaning of life is not revealed to him he arrives at a conclusion which fully justifies his search: it is this, "This is the end of the matter; all hath been heard: fear God and keep His commandments; for this is the whole duty of man."

At the present day many people are going over the same ground as

the Preacher, and it may be of interest to some to follow him step by step in his search for the meaning of life. There are three main steps in his search. In the first section (chaps. i.-vi.) he looks upon life from the point of view of a secularist; in the second section (chap. vii.) he turns a moralist; and finally (chaps. viii.-xii.) he turns to religion.

The Secularist Outlook

(i.) First, then, we have him searching with sore travail "all the works that are done under the sun" (i. 14). The various phenomena of our puzzling career lie before him, and he tries to reduce them to order. But though he toils and labours with all his wisdom they remain complicated and perplexing. "That which is crooked cannot be made straight; that which is wanting cannot be numbered" (i. 15). He discovers, as many have since discovered, that "in much wisdom" there "is much grief," and by increasing knowledge he increases "sorrow" (i. 18).

As he looks upon the revolving wheels of nature and life, man appears very insignificant (i. 3). He is only a single item in a vast succession; "one generation goeth and another generation cometh; and the earth abideth for ever." All is continual change, yet continual recurrence to the same starting point. He looks at the sun; it rises and sets and comes back to its rising again. He watches the winds, always whirling about, but always repeating themselves. He looks at the rivers, and he notices how the vapours rise from the sea and gather into the atmosphere. They then form into clouds, the clouds break on the mountain tops, the collected waters form the rivers, and the rivers flow into the sea, to go through the whole process again.

Is this, then, all that man lives for? Everything moving in unvarying circles; no novelty. Does the great wheel of the Universe just go on turning as if to no purpose? Is the earth just a kind of stage for men to shew themselves on one side and drop off at the other? And all the while the earth remains the same, just a dull stage for others to come on and make the same objectless appearance, and then in turn give way to others. Surely all this effort of the intellect to find a purpose in life is just "a striving after wind" (i. 17).

(ii.) Since nothing can be gained from the labour of the intellect the Preacher turns, like many another, to pleasure. He gathers round him everything which is calculated to gratify his senses (ii. 1). He makes great works, he builds houses, he lays out gardens and parks. He gets servants and maidens and great possessions. In his own words, "Whatsoever mine eyes desired I kept not from them: I withheld not my heart from any joy." It reminds one rather of Mr. Aldous Huxley's *Worship of Life*, which he describes in "Do What You Will" as the "Equilibrium of Balanced Excesses" (p. 279).

Once more he begins to despair, and in his extremity he tries to gain some comfort out of the fact that wisdom in itself is a treasure, that it exceeds folly "as light excelleth darkness" (ii. 13). But even this falls under his feet, for he remembers that the wise man dies as the fool: "The one event happeneth to them all." Consequently he begins to hate life. Even that which he has laboured for he must leave to the man that shall follow him (ii. 18).

He therefore arrives at the conclusion that men must just take things

as they are and make the best of them. He takes up the attitude of a fatalist: "There is nothing better for a man than that he should eat and drink, and make his soul enjoy good in his labour" (ii. 24).

(iii.) He looks out on the various scenes of life again and another point strikes him. He notices how everything seems to have its opposite, how every good is balanced by a corresponding evil (iii. 2-8). He thinks in passing, however, that if everything is balanced by its opposite and "there is a time for every purpose and for every work," then surely God will oppose unrighteous judgment by righteous when all men shall come before His tribunal (iii. 16-17).

But pessimism overtakes him again when he reflects that life must give way to death, and that the sons of men, so full of hopes and aims and great ambitions, must one day perish like the beasts (iii. 19-20). So he arrives at the same secularist conclusion as before, and thinks that "there is nothing better, than that a man should rejoice in his works; for that is his portion; for who shall bring him back to see what shall be after him?" (iii. 22).

(iv.) He then considers the wretched state of his fellow-men. He looks at the poor and finds them tyrannized over, and so overwhelmed is he at the sight of this grief that he praises "the dead that have been long dead more than the living that are yet alive" (iv. 2).

Those who are engaged in honest work and who are successful he finds have their hardships, and consequently considers even that a striving after the wind. The very existence of the indolent is a burden to him.

He goes into the houses of the rich to see if they are any more successful in finding any purpose in life. And he finds a man ceaselessly toiling, busily gathering together wealth. But his eye is never satisfied with riches; the more he gets the more he wants. And there is no one to whom he may leave his goods. And why? Because in his own mad eagerness for wealth he has refused to associate himself with anyone who might share his pleasures with him. After all, fellowship in poverty is better than solitary wealth: "If a man prevail against him that is alone, two shall withstand him; and a threefold cord is not quickly broken" (iv. 12). There is the same vanity and a striving after wind in the palaces of Kings (iv. 13-16).

(v.) The Preacher then turns to those who profess to be pious, and he wonders whether there is any superiority in them. And what does he find? For the most part there is no sincerity. They are rash with their mouths, and in their hearts are hasty to utter words before God which they do not fulfil (v. 4). Better, he says, that thou shouldest not vow, than that thou shouldest vow and not pay. How like the modern objection to some who call and profess themselves Christians!

Once more the wise man gives us the only verdict of secular wisdom: "Behold, that which I have seen to be good and to be comely is for one to eat and to drink, and to enjoy good in all his labour, wherein he laboureth under the sun, all the days of his life which God hath given him: for this is his portion" (v. 18).

The Moralist

As the Preacher meditated on this last conclusion he began to see that it was not, after all, an adequate conclusion. It is all very well, he thought, to say that we are to enjoy life as well as we can, but what of those who have no pleasures to take pleasure in? Furthermore, of what avail is this

worldly wisdom when the day of darkness comes? In his exasperation he asks, "Who knoweth what is good for man in his life, all the days of his vain life which he spendeth as a shadow?" Can any further purpose in life be found? Is there anything in life to make it worth while, anything lasting? Yes; and it is by considering the moral side of a man that the Preacher goes a step further in his gropings after Truth.

(i.) First of all, he says, we must cultivate character. A good name will be our consolation when all other pleasures have forsaken us. "A good name is better than precious ointment" (vii. 1).

(ii.) Secondly, we can best prepare for misfortune in life by cultivating a serious state of mind. This is not necessarily inconsistent with a thorough enjoyment of the things of this life, but it is certainly contrary to a life of hilarity and mirth. The serious man is more likely to meditate on the end of man and manage his affairs accordingly. "It is better to go into the house of mourning, than to go to the house of feasting: for that is the end of all men; and the living will lay it to his heart" (vii. 2). It reminds one of the prayer, "Teach us who survive in this and other daily spectacles of mortality to see how frail and uncertain our own condition is, and so to number our days, that we may seriously apply our hearts to that holy and heavenly wisdom, whilst we live here, which may in the end bring us to life everlasting."

(iii.) Thirdly, we must cultivate patience, so that when calamities come we have the strength to bear them. Pride, hastiness, and anger will be of no avail when sorrows come. "The patient in spirit is better than the proud in spirit" when misfortune overtakes us (vii. 8-9).

(iv.) And, finally, we must cultivate a state of mind which will raise us above outward things. "In the day of prosperity be joyful, and in the day of adversity consider: God hath even made the one side with the other" (vii. 14). "Wisdom is a defence even as money is a defence; but the excellence of knowledge is, that wisdom preserveth the life of him that hath it" (vii. 12). Wealth may ward off calamities from the body, but wisdom will strengthen the inner man. It is something inside of a man which no one can take from him, whereas wealth is a mere appendage which may any day drop off.

The Religious Solution

So far the Preacher has confined his enquiries to this side of the grave. But in this last section he begins to look forward to the dim mysteries beyond the grave. And as his thoughts leap over the narrow borderland of death he realizes that the attitude of the moralist is inadequate.

"The misery of man is great upon him. For he knoweth not that which shall be; for who can tell him how it shall be? There is no man that hath power over the spirit to retain the spirit; neither hath he power over the day of death" (viii. 6-8). Yet, in spite of the mystery of what lies beyond, the Preacher is convinced "that it shall be well with them that fear God . . . but it shall not be well with the wicked . . . because he feareth not God" (viii. 12-13). Yet no sooner has he touched this note of real wisdom than his heart fails him again. For, as far as this world experience goes, this does not seem to be God's law after all. Was it not the case "that there be righteous men, unto whom it happeneth according to the wicked," and "wicked men to whom it happeneth according to the work of the righteous"? And, besides this, they all die alike: "There

is one event to the righteous and to the wicked" (viii. 14, ix. 2). So for a moment he falls back into the old trains of thought: "Go thy way, eat thy bread with joy, and drink thy wine with a merry heart; for God hath already accepted thy works" (ix. 7 *ff.*). Then he goes on to consider once more the precariousness of life's joys and recommends the life of wisdom. Still the strains of worldly prudence are heard: "Rejoice, O young man, in thy youth," he cries, "and let thy heart cheer thee in the days of thy youth." He still recommends the gratification of every desire: "Walk in the ways of thine heart, and in the sight of thine eyes." Then he adds, as though on second thoughts: "But know thou, that for all these things God will bring thee unto judgment" (xi. 9-10).

The days will come, he says, when your judgment on all earthly joys will be, "I have no pleasure in them" (xii. 1). The sunshine of life will grow dim, and the clouds of sorrow will quickly gather in the sky; your limbs will tremble, sight will fail you, your voice will lose its sweetness and strength; stoutheartedness will give way to childish fears, and the lightest weight will burden you. Finally, you will go to your "long home" and mourners will go about the streets, "the dust will return to the earth as it was, and the spirit return unto God who gave it" (xii. 7). It is only when the Preacher considers these facts that he says: "Remember also thy Creator in the days of thy youth, or ever the evil days come" (xii. 1).

Thus, having meditated on all these different aspects of life, his considered conclusion is: "Fear God, and keep His commandments; for this is the whole duty of man. For God will bring every work to judgment, with every hidden thing, whether it be good or whether it be evil" (xii. 13, 14). "Amid all problems and perplexities, one light shines clear: the thread that leads man safely through the maze of life is loyal obedience to the Eternal Commandment" (S.P.C.K., *New Commentary*, i., p. 410). The rest can be safely left in the hands of God.

E. KENNETH LEE.

NOTE ON ST. LUKE ii. 49

CAN any thoughtful reader with the Greek before him at the passage (St. Luke ii. 49) giving the first recorded utterance of our Lord be satisfied with the rendering of it by our two current versions, "Wist ye not that I must be," etc., laying as they do no emphasis upon the position of the personal pronoun which He uses and so carefully places where such is demanded? If their rendering were sufficient, it seems certain that, as in cap. iv. 43, the pronoun would have stood immediately before or after the verb δεῖ. As it stands it surely means as much as would be conveyed by such a paraphrase as "I, being what 'I am.'" This plea is fortified by a similarly forcible use of a personal pronoun in Acts iv. 7, where the *γένος ἀρχιερατικόν* evidently wishing to put or keep "in their place" the *ἀγράμματοι καὶ ἰδιῶται* accused Apostles, ask *ἐν ποίᾳ δυνάμει . . . ἐποιήσατε τοῦτο ὑμεῖς*;="you, being what you are."

Incidentally, we must regret that the Revisers, debarred from italics by the curious (to our minds) misuse of them in A.V., did not consult and adopt for emphasis some such plan as that followed by Driver in his book on the Psalms—viz., smaller type for what has no equivalent in the original language and italics where stress is needed—*e.g.*, respectively, Psalm xix. 4 *seq.* and Psalm xx. 7, 8.

CHAS. E. SEAMAN.

TWO LITURGICAL EXPERIMENTS

BELOW are printed two liturgical experiments. We hope that the former may be used by some of our readers during Advent. The other could be used at any time. Many a priest must have "spread before the Lord," like Hezekiah, some book or document or picture, of his own production or on behalf of another. Here is a carefully thought out form of oblation. It comes from Cairo, and it is used by the Egypt branch of S.P.C.K.

I

PRAYER FOR THE BLESSING OF A CRIB

O Lord Jesus Christ, to whose cradle at Bethlehem the shepherds came with deep devotion: Bless, we beseech Thee, this crib, which we have set up in Thine honour; and grant that, as we gaze thereon, our love may be enkindled and our faith strengthened.

W. K. L. C.

II

DEDICATION OF A NEW PUBLICATION

The newly-printed book or picture being laid on the Altar, the reader shall say:

Reader: Let us dedicate to God this book (title) for the service of His children.

Who are we, O Lord, and what is our Society that we should be able to offer willingly the work of our hands and our minds? What have we that we have not received? For all things come of Thee, and of Thine own do we give Thee, from soiled hands and lives stained with sin.

Yet although we be unworthy to offer unto Thee any sacrifice,

(Here all shall speak the following prayer of dedication with the reader.)

People: We beseech Thee to accept this book, the child of our thought and toil, not weighing the merits of our work, but pardoning our offences through Jesus Christ our Lord. Amen.

Reader: Let Thy work appear unto Thy servants:

People: And Thy glory unto their children.

Reader: And let the beauty of the Lord our God be upon us:

People: And establish Thou the work of our hands upon us; Yea, the work of our hands establish Thou it.

Reader: Glory be to the Father and to the Son and to the Holy Ghost:

People: As it was in the beginning, is now, and ever shall be, world without end. Amen.

Reader and People: Go, little book, to do God service, to feed Christ's sheep that are dispersed abroad, and His children who are in the midst of this naughty world, that they may be saved through Christ for ever, to whom be the glory world without end. Amen.

A DEVOUT RHYME

(*After George Herbert*)

"Christ is all, and in all" (Col. iii. 11).

"Her light was clear as crystal. . . . The city was pure gold, like unto clear crystal. . . . The street of the city was pure gold, as it were transparent glory" (Rev. xxi. 11, 18, 21).

The Heavenly City gleams with CHRIST-ALL clear,
For in CHRIST ALL is found that men hold dear;
CHRIST ALL my joy and never-fading pleasure,
CHRIST ALL my Love, and my heart's only Treasure,
CHRIST ALL my Light—Lord, open Thou mine eyes,
CHRIST ALL my Life—and all else in me dies.
Lord, dare I—chief of sinners—hope to stand
Amid Thy ransomed saints' adoring band
In the pure splendour of the CHRIST-ALL Land.

J. WYLDE.

NOTES ON PERIODICALS

Jewish Quarterly Review. Vol. xxv., No. 2.

Rabbi M. H. Segal writes at some length on the Hebrew text of Ben Sira, and draws the conclusion that the primitive Hebrew text gave rise to four different Hebrew recensions, from which are derived the text of the Hebrew fragments, the Syriac of the Peshiṭṭa, and the Greek of the LXX. With reference to the Hebrew fragments it will be remembered that Rabbi Joseph Marcus recently discovered a new leaf of the Hebrew MS. (xxxii. 16 to xxxiv. 1), and published it in the *Jewish Quarterly Review*, No. 3, vol. xxi.

Rabbi R. A. Habas reviews Breasted's *Dawn of Conscience*, the importance of which he recognizes in spite of its over-estimation of the degree of Egyptian influence on Old Testament literature.

W. H. Blumenthal contributes a brief article on Dr. Cecil Roth's *Life of Richard Brothers*. This individual was the author of the British Israel theory, which today is said to number about two million adherents. Brothers wrote strange pamphlets and showered them gratis (a weakness of British Israelites !) on all and sundry, including members of the Royal Family. For his persistence and for his ambitious schemes, which included his own succession to the throne of England, he was rewarded with a stay of eleven years in a lunatic asylum. Perhaps a perusal of this volume might cure any of our acquaintances who may be bitten with this modern madness.

Dr. Solomon Grayzel reviews a considerable amount of Jewish historical literature, chiefly American and German. The most useful of the volumes to which he calls attention is the new edition by Dr. Cecil Roth of Dr. Israel Abrahams' *Jewish Life in the Middle Ages*.

R. D. MIDDLETON.

REVIEWS

THE EPISTLE TO THE ROMANS. By Karl Barth. Translated from the sixth edition by Edwyn C. Hoskyns, Bart., M.A., Fellow of Corpus Christi College in the University of Cambridge. Oxford University Press; London: Humphrey Milford, 1933. Pp. xxi+547. 21s. net.

"We know that human language can never break through to the absolute: for that would be the end of all things, and to that we can never be so bold as to set our hands . . . there exists the abnormal, irregular, revolutionary—in the most significant sense of the word 'revolutionary'—possibility of venturing, half seriously, half jocularly, upon an advance into the absolute. The Epistle to the Romans is such an advance. It is theology, a conversation about God, undertaken with penetrating understanding of the One in all."

There is perhaps no more characteristic sequence of sentences in Barth's work than the above. It is, as so much in the work is, at least as illuminative of the purposes of Barth as of the purposes of St. Paul. It shews what he is sure cannot be achieved, and yet at the same time must be ventured. It reveals a man in deadly earnest, and yet conscious that he is not thereby justified, but that he must retain the power to smile at his own efforts; a man who, when, as so often, he includes every representative of human goodness and wisdom within the category of those who have sinned and come short of the glory of God, certainly does not except Barth—and "Barthianism." And it ends with one of those surprising notes that Barth introduces to the confusion of those who would try to systematize his teaching, making them wonder how far they have understood him correctly, and alternatively, or at the same time, how far he is consistent with himself. For those last words, "the One in all," are not what we should expect to find him writing. "God the Holy One, the altogether Other": that is what we associate with Barth. It is as the prophet of the transcendence of God pushed to its furthest extreme that Barth has come as the challenging note of interrogation to the Christian theology of our age. And when he speaks of it there is never the smallest trace of qualification or apology. Rather does he seem to delight in choosing words that will deeply shock those who claim and rejoice in a religious experience of the friendliness of God. "Obedience," he writes in comment upon the words, "but they did not all hearken to the glad tidings" (x. 16), "is he sense for the specific peculiarity of the Divine and for the

Wholly-Otherness of God, the King, the Monarch, the Despot." There is nothing surprising in the fact that shortly before, in discussing the predestinarian passages of the ninth chapter, he has appended to his denial of the idea that the will of God is "some good thing, operating independently, to which God is subject" (a denial to be cordially welcomed on both theological and moral grounds), the words, "His will is rather the source and sanction of all good, and it is good only because it is what He wills." Here Barth, who asks us not to look at him simply through the spectacles of Emil Brunner, is using the same spectacles as those of the Swiss theologian, and they do not come easily to an English reader of Hooker and Butler. For there is a positive tradition in English theology, of which John Stuart Mill's protest against the ascription of meaningless honorific titles to God is the negative pole, which has never been overwhelmed by the revolutionary anti-humanism of the Luthero-Calvinistic soteriology. It has assumed, to put it in plain and homely language, that man does know within limits what he is talking about when he speaks of good and evil, and that conscience has a relative trustworthiness. It is very difficult to regard Barth as not utterly opposed to that whole tradition, and as breaking every connection between human reason and what may be known of God, between human conscience and what may be approved as good.

This problem, which is met constantly in Barth's Romans, is one that belongs both to ontology and to the theory of knowledge. And it is one of the great difficulties confronting the student of Barth that it is hard to the point of impossibility to disentangle his two aspects or spheres of the problem. The difficulty is, indeed, implicit in his stress upon man as fallen. The gulf which lies between God and man in virtue of God being the wholly Other, which represents Barth's metaphysic of transcendence, is deepened by the fact that man is fallen man: hence, man is completely at a loss ethically. It is no wonder that Barth has been regarded as involved in a Manichæan doctrine of the world and of human nature. Yet most certainly that is not the case. On the contrary, Barth cannot be understood in respect of his profoundest convictions unless full account is taken of his strong emphasis upon the original character of the created world, of that "unobservable union between the Creator and the creature," which is not first effected, but is restored through the Cross and Resurrection of Christ. "How," asks Barth, commenting upon the text "As many as are led by the Spirit of God, they are sons of God," "could I experience the infinite bitter-sweet tribulation which the Spirit prepares for me, were it not that originally I shared in the Truth and

was originally God's son? God and His creatures originally one stock and one family! Yes, when we are led by the Spirit, this occurrence is Truth."

It is obvious that Canon Lilley is entirely right in drawing attention to the crucial issue of Barth's anthropology, and he will carry much opinion with him in his plea that along with the fullest stress upon religion as a bond between God and man which God alone originates, and upon grace and revelation, "yet in that bond man surely counts for something." The natural man is not merely passive (see his *Reason and Revelation*, p. 108). I do not see how we can say less than that and keep man human. Otherwise Manichæanism will be coming in by the back door, and the truth of the original creation will have been lost in the truth of the Fall. And yet once again it is necessary to beware of regarding Barth as though he were a theologian of the old Evangelical tradition, making sharp distinctions between the converted and the unconverted, the saved and the lost. Some of the most curious and arresting passages in the book are written in direct attack upon that way of thinking, including the whole of the treatment of St. Paul's use of the Esau-Jacob contrast in Malachi. Barth expressly rejects the application of the "doctrine of election and rejection (Predestination) to the psychological unity of this or that individual." For him the "secret of eternal, twofold predestination" does not divide men, but unites them; "in its presence they all stand on one line." And it is to be noted that Barth's unsparing condemnations of *human* righteousness, of which the sentence "the more successfully the good and the right assume concrete form, the more they become evil and wrong," may be taken as an instance, leave him free to have a confidence in "the existential salvation of the heathen," which Augustine totally lacked, which I should be surprised to learn that Calvin possessed. Barth is, indeed, more thorough-going in his reliance on the love of God than were either of those thinkers to whom he owes so much. The passage in which Barth enlarges upon the "unholy and unbelieving children of the world," who in "their merry freedom" are not objects of our love, since long before we appeared upon the scene they had entered into God's righteousness and shared in His forgiveness, is exceedingly difficult to grasp, but at least it shews that Barth sees no limit to what he calls the "unobservable, impossible possibility of God."

The problem of knowledge presses upon us in connection with Barth's emphasis on revelation and his Christology. One asks, Is there any criterion of revelation on Barth's presuppositions as to the incompetence of man for the knowledge of God?

Anything that suggests a directness of religious knowledge, such as is to be found in mysticism and in most forms of religious experience, is abhorrent to him. While everywhere there exists an "impress of revelation"—another of Barth's unexpected affirmations which shews how careful the interpreter of him must be—the witness which is thereby yielded is to the Unknown God. The claim to direct knowledge leads not to God, but to the "No-God," who is but the creation of man's arrogance; the true God is unknown, "apart from the knowledge which He Himself—as the Unknown—gives to us in Christ." This sounds like the old Ritschlian assertions as to Christ being the sole Revealer of God. But Barth has nothing really in common with Ritschl or Herrmann. Their appeal was to the historic Jesus, and to the manifestation of God in His teaching and Person. For Barth history is as incapable of mediating a direct approach to God as is philosophy or religious experience. The presence of Jesus in history does not mean that at that point there is "a directly visible divine-humanity or human-divinity." It is true that in Christ the unknown eternal world intersects vertically our world of history and time, but that involves no direct knowledge of Jesus as the Christ or of that world whence He comes. Very definitely does Barth refuse to appeal to the Resurrection as an historical event. Everything within the context of history is questionable, and if the Resurrection is brought within that context it cannot escape from history's relativity and obscurity. The significance of the Resurrection lies precisely in its being the "non-historical event *κατ' ἐξοχήν*."

It is obvious that, if Barth is right, the usual forms of Christian apologetic are not only worthless, but essentially perverse. They try to force a way to the knowledge of God which God has barred. They aim at a demonstration of the Divinity of Jesus, whereas in that historical Person what we are really faced with is an "impenetrable incognito." What then is left? Nothing but faith; and nowhere is Barth more uncompromising than when he speaks of faith. Faith "regarded psychologically is always a leap into the darkness of the unknown, a flight into empty air." "There are no human avenues of approach, no 'way of salvation'; to faith there is no ladder which must be first scaled. Faith is its own initiative, its own presupposition. . . . For all faith is both simple and difficult; . . . for all it is a leap into the void. And it is possible for all, only because for all it is equally impossible."

There are times when the reader of Barth may well be tempted to turn away impatiently, unable to bear any more with what seems to him either to mean nothing at all, or to mean

what is obviously untrue. And I think that there can be no doubt that Barth does leave us with a Christianity that neither can, nor ought to try to, justify its truth by any such appeal to reason or history as has been common in Christian apologetic. But I am equally sure that to look on Barth as simply the great "Misleader" is a profound mistake, while any attempt to explain him as a post-war phenomenon of reaction and obscurantism is mere trifling. The strength of Barth—and it is a strength of immense value—lies in what he has to say about God; his errors lie in what he has to say about man and in a theory of knowledge, if the phrase may be allowed, which invalidates every word that man utters about God and leaves man face to face with the bare Word of revelation, to which he can apply no tests whatever. Yet the truth about God, about His transcendence, His holiness, and His love, is more important than the error about man. Doubtless that sentence suggests an ultimately unsatisfactory dichotomy, but the contrast may stand.

There is much more on which a reviewer would gladly comment: on the exegesis of particular passages, on Barth's treatment of the later chapters of Romans, and the ethical problems which emerge in connection with them—here he is often most arresting and most difficult—and on his use of such keywords as "existential" and "Krisis." But it must suffice to end with two remarks: first, that despite what Barth may have desired and intended, the value of this book is not to be found in it as a commentary upon an Epistle of St. Paul; secondly, that a translator can hardly ever have deserved to a fuller extent the gratitude and admiration of his readers than does Sir Edwyn Hoskyns for his labour, even though that has been a labour of love.

J. K. MOZLEY.

THE APOSTOLIC TRADITION OF HIPPOLYTUS. Translated into English, with Introduction and Notes, by Burton Scott Easton. Cambridge University Press. 7s. 6d.

This book is of great importance as giving to the English reader a Church Order of the beginning of the third century, the work of the famous Hippolytus, the most learned theologian of the Roman Church, in which he gives ecclesiastical rules and liturgical forms current in his day. Until the epoch-making investigations of Professor E. Schwartz (1915) and Dom R. H. Connolly (1916), who wrote independently of each other, we knew of this work only as the Oriental versions of a Greek manual commonly called by modern scholars the "Egyptian

Church Order," and thought to be dated not before the fourth century. Now, however, mainly in consequence of the discovery by Dr. E. Hauler in 1900 of a palimpsest at Verona containing fragments of a Latin version of the above Church Order, this Latin version is shewn to be a fairly faithful reproduction of the lost work of Hippolytus mentioned on his marble chair in the Lateran Museum at Rome. The original Greek (for Romans at that date wrote in Greek) is lost, except for some small portions traced through later works. The Oriental versions—Sahidic (Coptic), Arabic, Ethiopic—contain additional matter; but where they agree with the Latin we may be practically sure that we have the words of Hippolytus. For supplying the lacunæ of the Latin they must be used with some caution; though when they are supported by Church Orders derived from the *Apostolic Tradition*, such as the *Testament of Our Lord*, the *Apostolic Constitutions* (book viii.), the *Canons of Hippolytus* (these are of the fourth, or even as some think of the fifth, century), we can in many cases trust them as giving the work of Hippolytus. But the result of the recent research is that considerable revision is necessary of all that was written before 1916 on the subject of the Church Orders, a fact of which no one is more conscious than the present reviewer. In particular, the idea that the so-called *Canons of Hippolytus* are, with the exception of some interpolations, the work of Hippolytus and the parent of the other Church Orders is now untenable. Dom Connolly has shewn that these Canons are a comparatively late and a very unskilful redaction of the *Apostolic Tradition* (*The So-called Egyptian Church Order*, p. 132).

Dr. Easton shews by marginal signs exactly what, in his opinion, we may treat as certainly Hippolytean, and what may be possibly or probably so. On the other hand some phrases in the Oriental versions cannot but be later than Hippolytus, as, for example, the phrase "consubstantial Trinity," which points to a time after the rise of the Arian controversy in the fourth century.

The great importance of the recent investigations is that in many respects our evidence for Church customs has now been pushed back for over a century; for the date of the *Apostolic Tradition* is *c.* A.D. 217. Thus, for example, we have now the earliest known Eucharistic Liturgy. The greater part of that hitherto known as an Egyptian or Ethiopic Liturgy of the fourth century (printed by Dr. Brightman, *Lit. E. and W.*, p. 189) is now seen to be Roman, and of much earlier date. It is noticeable that it has, after the Narrative of the Last Supper, the Invocation of the Holy Ghost, which is of what is known as the "implicit form," like that of the *Liturgy of Addai and*

Mari, asking for the Holy Spirit to come for a blessing on the communicants without any explicit mention of a change in the elements, as in most liturgies of the fourth century and later. No stress is laid in the *Apostolic Tradition* on any particular words being the "consecrating words." Then the details of baptism and confirmation, with unctions and laying on of hands —the immersion and the confirmation are here one rite—give us much more complete and early evidence than we get, for example, from the references in Tertullian.

Dr. Easton rightly calls attention in his historical Introduction to the fact that Hippolytus was of a very conservative turn of mind, and that the customs he describes are probably those of his earliest years; so that the *Apostolic Tradition* may be safely invoked for Roman practice some fifty years earlier than its own date.

Dr. Easton does not set a great value on the Ethiopic version, which is the fullest of all, and of which Dom Connolly gives an English translation in the many places where the Latin is deficient. Yet it will be remembered that, even if the Ethiopic is not translated direct from the Greek, the Greek text underlying it is somewhat different from that underlying the Sahidic; also that the Ethiopic contains many liturgical forms omitted by the Sahidic, but which we now know are in some cases Hippolytean. It would have been useful if the Ethiopic conclusion of the Eucharistic Liturgy had been given among the "Later Additions" (p. 58 *ff.*), for though these concluding paragraphs are certainly not Hippolytean, there is perhaps nothing in them, as Dom Connolly points out (*op. cit.*, p. 177 *n.*), that might not have come from the age of Hippolytus.

This book will be found to be of great use to the student of origins, even if some of the views in the Introduction and Notes may be thought to be doubtful. Dr. Easton has given us a vivid picture of early Church life.

A. J. MACLEAN.

NOTICES

THE LIVING RELIGIONS OF THE INDIAN PEOPLE. By Nicol Macnicol, D.Litt., D.D. S.C.M. Press. 10s. 6d.

MODERN TENDENCIES IN WORLD RELIGIONS. By Charles S. Braden, Ph.D. Allen and Unwin. 10s.

LIFE BEYOND DEATH IN THE BELIEFS OF MANKIND. By James Thayer Addison. Allen and Unwin. 8s. 6d.

The combination of Christian conviction with scientific interest and the love of Indian people gives Dr. Macnicol's book exceptional importance. The call of India to the Church in Great Britain is paramount,

and whether for work or for prayer this volume is indispensable. Its facts are essential and its faith is vital. With sympathetic insight the author reveals the characteristics of the six great "roads of the spirit" that are trodden today in India—Hinduism, Jainism, Sikhism, Zoroastrianism, Islam, Christianity—the first three indigenous, the latter immigrant. In each case a little history is followed by an exposition of the main tenets and an appreciation of the present position, largely based on personal knowledge. Although "the aim of the book is not to institute comparisons between the religions or to criticize them," considerations are occasionally adduced which imply judgments. For instance, in the valuable chapter on *Bhakti*, concerning which Dr. Macnicol writes with unsurpassed authority, we are reminded that "this emotional religion, attractive as it often is, fails in ethical effectiveness as a movement for the reform of evils in the Hindu social system." As an example of the depth to which the discussion is carried, reference may be made to the account of pantheistic tendencies in Islam, or to the description of the hylozoism of the Jainas. Constant reference is made to the most important literature and the information is all up to date. By the way, when did Nanak die? On p. 45 we read 1528, and on p. 210 it is 1533, whereas E.R.E. gives 1538 and R.G.G. 1539. A map would have been useful, and also a glossary of Indian terms.

Dr. Braden's book is a well-documented presentation of current religious phenomena, and provides material of great importance which is not easily accessible, drawn from magazines and reports as well as from books published outside this country. In the first chapter, five principal factors of change are noted as affecting religion—viz., scientific discovery, economic change, political evolution, intellectual change, cultural interchange. The remaining chapters describe the modern religious situation in India, China, Japan, Russia, and in Islam and Judaism. The suggestion that this century is witnessing "more profound movements in the direction of change in religion" than any other age can hardly be substantiated. Neither can we agree that "religion finds its chief function in the satisfaction of human needs." A deeper insight would have considered the relation of prophetic inspiration to progress, and would have shewn the part played by the inherent vitality of religion itself. We miss here the spirit of Dr. Macnicol, who is quoted on p. 30 as "a long-time missionary of the Anglican Church"!

James Thayer Addison has written a beautiful and impressive book on man's unquenchable hope. He has indicated his sources in a long list of books, but it is a pity he did not give his references. It is strange that Warren's *Buddhism in Translations* should not be included in the bibliography, and another good addition would be Edwyn Bevan's *The Hope of a World to Come* (London, 1930). In the account of Hebrew faith in chapter xvii. we miss a reference to that experience of fellowship with God which has in it the earnest of immortality, as shewn, *e.g.*, in Psalm lxxiii. But it is a good book, and would serve well as an introduction to the comparative study of religion. The longest chapter is on the resurrection of the body. Here and elsewhere the writer indicates his own preference for the modernist view, though the book as a whole is descriptive and not critical.

J. R. COATES.

VALE. By W. R. Inge, D.D. Longmans. 3s. 6d.

The autobiography of so prominent a Churchman naturally suggests an attempt to appraise his life's work. First of all must come the prestige that accrues to the Church of England, at a time when few prominent literary men are convinced Anglicans, from the fact that one whose writings command such universal attention believes in our Church. No one can reach the Dean's position in literature nowadays without a considerable output, which has necessarily involved rigid self-limitation. He has deliberately neglected much of what is popularly supposed to be the work of a high ecclesiastic. At a time when Cathedrals are more important compared with parish churches than ever before, St. Paul's stands out of the popularizing movement; no attempt has been made to turn it into the Chester Cathedral of London. But, as the Dean says, he was deliberately appointed to his post because he was a kind of "minor prophet," and would not have been justified in turning aside from the path marked out. Even with this withdrawal from practical Church life the administrative duties of a Dean remain heavy, and nothing short of amazing energy could have equipped him for writing his great books. The range and depth of study required to produce his Bampton and Gifford Lectures must have been prodigious. Hardly less onerous must have been the effort required to interpret modern astronomy to the layman in *God and the Astronomers*, though Dr. Inge regards this book with dissatisfaction. That so erudite a writer should have produced two of the best devotional books of our time in *Speculum Animæ* and *Personal Religion and the Life of Devotion* is indeed surprising. Let no one think that the great output of his later life argues easy writing. It would be a safe guess that so clear and distinguished a style was not formed without much toil in earlier life.

The Dean's tribute to the difference made by his marriage is touching. Strong as the practical arguments are in favour of clerical celibacy, the obstinate fact remains that men of a certain temperament cannot find themselves until they are convinced that one person at least believes in them.

Perhaps Dr. Inge will appear in days to come as a representative Englishman who identified himself too closely with his times to have a permanent message, apart from his Gifford Lectures, which will always appeal to the few. But our duty is to the age in which we live. God will raise up others to speak to the heart of the next generation.

W. K. LOWTHER CLARKE.

THE CHRISTIAN PRIEST OF TODAY. By C. E. Osborne, Litt.D. A. R. Mowbray. 5s.

This book covers a very wide field, touching as it does on most matters which concern the life and work of a priest. We are glad to be recalled to the old-fashioned ideas—"the ideas of the Ordination Service"—of the clergy as men of prayer, as teachers because they are learners, as men who love their people and live among them and for them, ideas that are sometimes obscured by one less pleasing—of the clergy as officials concerned with statistics and money raising. Dr. Osborne wisely calls attention to the danger of using the pulpit or any other means of spiritual influence for the inculcation of political views; the priest who attempts

to do so will not be taken seriously when he tries to give a strong lead in some crisis. The book would be useful as a basis for discussion in small gatherings of clergy.

R. D. MIDDLETON.

THE PARISH PRIEST AS PREACHER. By E. F. Odling. A. R. Mowbray. 1s. 6d.

Little books are always in danger of being overlooked. This little book should have a wide circle of clerical readers. It is packed full of valuable advice which could hardly have been given in a better form. From one chapter only do we vigorously dissent—"Preaching other Men's Sermons." So long as the Parish Priest has his definite time for daily study, with a book on hand for odd moments, and makes his sermon preparation with Bible and Prayer Desk—the message is not likely to fail. The reviewer remembers being greatly helped when staying in a Religious House by seeing a member of the Order, a well-known Mission Priest, constantly in the chapel preparing his addresses, mostly on his knees. The advice in this little book to begin our sermon preparation on Monday morning should be taken to heart by us all.

R. D. MIDDLETON.

THE SPIRIT OF CHRISTMAS. By Alick Bouquet. Longmans. 3s. 6d.

This is a beautiful book full of deeply spiritual teaching given in a simple and attractive way. The perusal of it will help many in their preparation for the keeping of the great Festival and add colour and charm to not a few Christmas addresses. Perhaps the most attractive of the chapters is the last, with its insistence on the Spirit of Joy. Where did the author find that charming story with which the little volume closes?

R. D. MIDDLETON.

ADDRESSES TO "CHRISTIAN MINOR." By Kenneth Menzies. S.P.C.K. 4s.

Fortunate are the boys who have the opportunity of hearing regularly such sermons as those contained in this delightful collection. Catholic doctrine is brought into direct touch with everyday life, and ethical conduct is based securely upon a firm foundation of dogma, while the whole is presented in a way likely to hold the attention and to ensure that what has been heard will be retained in the memory. If all public school religion were of the kind that is reflected in these pages, the manhood of the future would be adequately equipped to face life from the right standpoint.

There is a clear exposition of the doctrine of the Atonement given under the title of "The Meaning of the Cross." Because sin has two aspects, that of guilt and that of power, both of which must be removed if man is to be set free completely, Christ deals with sin in a twofold way:

> He died that we might be forgiven:
> He died to make us good.

The sermon entitled "The Paradox of the Gospel" sets forth admirably the relation between the Real Presence on the altar and the Incarnation.

H. S. Box.

THE IDEA OF THE SUPERNATURAL. By L. V. Lester-Garland. S.P.C.K. 5s.

VON HÜGEL AND THE SUPERNATURAL. By A. Hazard Dakin. S.P.C.K. 12s.

The statement is often made—and it is a true one—that the confusion of thought today is largely due to the absence of the sense of the supernatural. The recognition of this loss has lately led several writers on religion from the Christian standpoint to treat of this subject. Perhaps the real significance of the Theology of Crisis is its emphasis upon the supernatural and upon the transcendence of God. Brunner's *Der Mittler* has recently appeared in an English form, following upon the translation of Barth's *Römerbrief*, and we have had Barthian books like Dr. Camfield's thought-provoking *Revelation and the Holy Spirit*, and others which deal with the supernatural in a somewhat different way, such as Dr. Adams Brown's *God at Work*.

Mr. Lester-Garland is the author of a book on the religious philosophy of von Hügel, and the influence of the Baron's thought is evident in this new work of his, especially in his treatment of the question of the miraculous. Von Hügel seems to have adopted a position in regard to miracles distinct from and even at variance with the traditional doctrine. His view seems to be akin to what may be called the "modern" view; which may be traced back to Ritschl and ultimately to Schleiermacher. And this conception of the miraculous shews itself in Mr. Lester-Garland's chapter, "What is a Miracle?" Not every reader will agree with this chapter.

But this author rightly insists that the concept of the supernatural is bound up with belief in God as a living, personal Being. Apart from this belief the term is without meaning. There is no place for the supernatural in any so-called religion which proceeds wholly from the subjective consciousness of the individual or the race, or in any pantheistic system in which the immanence of the spiritual is so stressed that its transcendence is either denied or ignored.

Dr. Dakin's book will help many to understand the thought of von Hügel. It deals with Epistemology, Intimations of the Supernatural Religion, Mysticism, Doctrines about God, and Doctrines about Man.

Although all his writings are dominated by interest in the supernatural, and although several characteristics of it are put forward in his essay on *Christianity and the Supernatural*, von Hügel never gave a precise definition of what the word meant for him. Virtually, his starting-point is the modern idealist view that the supernatural is what is not strictly natural, in the sense of what can be disposed of by the methods of science. Reality is permeated just as much, or rather more, by moral and religious values than by values of a scientific kind. But the Baron goes much further than this view, which may easily become a variety of pantheism. He centres the supernatural upon a personal God. God is something more than truth, goodness and beauty considered as values inherent in the structure of nature. God is above the cosmic order. The values inherent in the world may be called immanently supernatural. But God, in whom all values are focussed, is transcendent as well as immanent.

Objections have sometimes been urged against von Hügel's well-known analysis of religion into the three elements: institutional, intellectual, and mystical; and his associating with each of these elements certain psychological, physiological, and logical parallels. But these analogies were

intended merely to be illustrations which might be discarded at once if they were found not to be helpful, and his discussion of the three elements in no way depends upon the analogies, but stands entirely on its own merits.

More important, however, than this objection is that which might be directed against the importance he attached to the intellectual element in religion. Does not the intellectual requirement restrict religion to a small class of intellectual snobs? But the Baron himself anticipates the objection by recalling that the intellectual element is no more limited to any one class than the other two elements. Like them it varies very much in degree. And it is not simply a matter of science and philosophy. These are but expressions of a much wider function of human personality.

Both these books are valuable and timely, and will be useful not only to the student, but also to the general reader. We recommend them to all who seek a remedy for the present-day loss of the sense of the supernatural.

H. S. Box.

THE GOSPELS: A SHORT INTRODUCTION. By Vincent Taylor, D.D. Epworth Press. 2s. 6d.

This is the second edition, containing a few corrections and additions, of a work first published in 1930. It is precisely what its title suggests, an introduction to the study and use of the Gospels. In it the reader will find, set out in a not unattractive form, the material necessary for the consideration of the problems of sources, date, authorship and interrelation which the Gospels present. The method of Form-Criticism is explained, and the whole book is so fully annotated that it will serve as a bibliography of recent study. Further, although the author consciously refrains from discussing "the deepest and most beautiful things in the Gospel," he does not hesitate to shew where the value of each Gospel, and of the results of criticism, lies. Needless to say, he treats of the Proto-Luke hypothesis. This book, guaranteed as it is by the sound scholarship of its author, should enable the most technically uninstructed reader to become familiar with the technical study of the Gospels.

NOEL DAVEY.

THE VICTORY OF FAITH. By J. O. Nash, D.D. S.P.C.K. 4s.

Dr. Nash in this little book attempts, to quote the Archbishop of York in the Foreword, "to set out the scheme of the Christian Faith so that it is seen to be a coherent whole, and is also seen to cohere with modern knowledge as its appropriate climax and principle of unity." The readers the author has in mind are mainly the children of the secondary schools in South Africa, where Dr. Nash has had long teaching experience, but the book will be found of great value for all who desire to help children to understand the Christian religion.

The method of the book is expository, and not really apologetic. Thus there is no serious attempt to grapple with difficulties, particularly in the case of the two natures in the Incarnate Lord. This, however, is one of its great merits, since for children brevity is essential, and technical terms of philosophy and theology need avoiding. This Bishop Nash has succeeded in accomplishing, particularly in his treatment of the Fall and

of the Holy Trinity. The practical implications of religion in worship and prayer are continually stressed.

At the end of each of the four sections into which the book is divided are footnotes. These would have been better omitted, since they are badly arranged and often obscure. One other strange trait which frequently recurs is an anti-Russian bogy, and this the reader will probably find unnecessarily tedious.

F. R. ARNOTT.

EVANGELICAL INFLUENCE IN ENGLISH LIFE. By J. T. Inskip, D.D., Bishop of Barking. Macmillan. 5s.

This book contains the Golden Lectures delivered in the Church of St. Margaret Lothbury in 1932-3. Dr. Inskip covers a very wide field, attempting to discuss Evangelicalism from both the theological and historical standpoints. Thus his first chapters deal with the evangelical message, which stresses the redeeming love of the Cross, and the importance of the individual soul. Then follow discussions on the Church and ministry and the sacraments, and finally a historical survey from Wycliffe to the present day. The whole book is most readable, and one rejoices in its atmosphere of broad charity, although occasionally the arguments are apt to become verbose and lack logical connection. Special importance is given, as is justly due, to the magnificent work of such evangelicals as Shaftesbury and Wilberforce, as well as to the stimulus bestowed on foreign missions through the efforts of the Church Missionary Society.

Dr. Inskip is inclined to distort the teaching of the Church of England in favour of the Evangelical interpretation. Thus he argues, in the face of the Anglican Ordinal, that episcopacy is only of the *bene esse* of the Church, and that we must recognize the ministers of the Free Churches as "real ministers." Is it true, moreover, to assert that the Church of England regards the priesthood as a ministry of the Word, rather than of the sacraments? It is difficult to believe that it was the intention of the English Reformers to turn the Mass into a Communion Service, as if there was some fundamental difference between the two. The Bishop assumes that only a Receptionist view of the Blessed Sacrament is maintainable in the English Prayer Book, and quotes Hooker, *Ecclesiastical Polity*, V., lxvii. 6, in support of such a contention. The Catechism and much of the language in our liturgy give equally strong support to the doctrine of the Real Presence, and in other places Hooker clearly seems to teach such a view—*e.g.*, V. lxvii. 7 and lxii. 12. On the historical side, also, one feels that Dr. Inskip inclines to exaggerate the enormities of Mary's reign; finally, is it true to say that the whole blame of the Wesleys' secession rested with the Church? Was there not also, as the Bishop of Oxford says in his Charge at his Diocesan Visitation, 1934 (p. 12), "a disproportion in his [Wesley's] view of Christianity, which made schism inevitable"?

F. R. ARNOTT.

LIFE AND SOUL. By Max Loewenthal. Allen and Unwin. 8s. 6d.

This study of the characteristics of animate matter may be read with profit by all who wish to follow recent trends in physiological theory and critical philosophy. The first part will be heavy reading to those who are

unacquainted with the terminology of modern Physics and Chemistry; and a brief abstract of this section would have been a welcome addition to the book. In the second half Dr. Loewenthal develops his theory of the Soul as a four-dimensional world unlimited in space and time. In an important paragraph he stresses the weakness of practically all philosophical thought arising from the neglect of a third Quantity besides Space and Time—namely, Degree. Dr. Loewenthal has a persuasive style, and even if unconvinced at the end, we found him an interesting and stimulating writer.

GEORGE WATSON.

THE INFINITY OF GOD. By Bertrand R. Brasnett, Principal of the Theological College of the Episcopal Church in Scotland. Longmans. 7s. 6d.

Infinity is taken in this book as equivalent to boundlessness, and is applied to some of the Divine attributes, in particular to omniscience. It is affirmed that Deity cannot be subject to ignorance, but it is questioned whether there is in God a kind of voluntary ignorance. The writer distinguishes between not knowing because one cannot know, and not knowing because one will not know. God can know all that He wills to know, but it is suggested that "it is clearly desirable that God should not have too full a knowledge of man's activities if such knowledge is going in any way to mar His perfectness." "If to know the evil of man's heart God must Himself become evil, then it is better that He should be ignorant."

The general character of the book is fairly illustrated by these examples. It consists of highly speculative independent reflections on the idea of Deity. Summing up "the extent to which he has analysed the Divine Omniscience," the writer concludes that there is in God a complete knowledge of all human thoughts and words and deeds: adding, however, the unexpected remark that it is unthinkable that there should be in God any ignorance caused by sloth cr laziness. At a later stage the writer reiterates that God, if He is to be our God, must know the very secrets of our hearts, but proceeds to discuss the relation of animal activities to the Divine Omniscience. It is then declared to be "questionable if even God can know why a spirit or a man should seek to persuade himself to yield to that what is to his injury and his harm."

W. J. SPARROW SIMPSON.

CHRISTIAN MYTH AND RITUAL. By E. O. James, D.Litt. Murray. 12s.

The general reader, if he be a Christian who cares for Catholic ceremonial, may be disposed to ask, when he has read this book, "To what purpose?" He may even entertain an uneasy apprehension that here is an attack on the Church's system of worship, and that the book merely repeats the offensive suggestion sometimes made in hostile quarters that the simplicity of primitive Christianity has been overlaid by a vast accumulation of pagan belief and practice carried over from pre-Christian times. This would be a complete misunderstanding, of course, of what Dr. James has written. As he has found it necessary to point out, since the publication of the book, he has "dealt with a common spiritual pattern that arose in the advanced civilization of the ancient East, and subsequently was given a new evaluation and orientation in the emergence of

Christianity." He treats of pattern-formation, not of survival; and his perfectly sound position, as he states it in the preface of his book, is that "it is no disparagement of a religion to discover a common pattern of myth and ritual forming the framework within which higher ethical and spiritual conceptions have developed." The book is, in effect, a new and valuable demonstration of the truth that the soul of man is naturally Christian, written especially for students of anthropology and the history of religion, but full of interest also for all who care to see the Christian religion related in its expression to the expression of earlier faiths, without the smallest abatement of its claim to uniqueness.

The field is well covered by Dr. James in the eleven chapters of his historical study. Beginning with an examination of the Divine Kingship and the ceremony of Coronation, he passes on to deal in turn with Ordination, Initiation, the Eucharist, Marriage, Burial, and Processions, and treats finally of Sacred Drama and Seasonal Games. In each section there is evidence of much careful research; and he would be an unusually well-equipped student of the history of Christian ritual and ceremonial who found nothing that was new to him in the abundance of material here supplied. All but beginners, on the other hand, will no doubt find much with which they are already familiar. But beginners and advanced students alike will rejoice that the method of this study has been boldly adopted by an Anglican priest, and that he has proved so expert in its use. The historical and comparative study of religion is still very largely in the hands of those who are, to say the least, something less than convinced Christians; and it is a matter of gratitude that Dr. James should be so ably assisting the Church to take its place in this vitally important department of learning.

O. HARDMAN.

IS THE RESURRECTION TRUE? By D. F. Brundrit. Philip Allan. 5s.

Mr. Brundrit puts the New Testament and Apocryphal testimony to the Resurrection in the witness-box and exposes it to the most searching cross-examination, while all the time himself remaining judge rather than counsel. It seems a pity that he rules out of order all evidence that seems doctrinally motived; even if Luke and John are deliberately anti-docetic, it must surely be allowed that their anti-docetism testifies to their conviction that there was factual reason for so being. It is, moreover, possible that the jury are not altogether convinced by one or two "confident conjectures," such as that John Mark was the "young man" at the tomb. (Mr. Brundrit overlooked some evidence for his own case here, I think; if, as he says, the incident in St. Mark xiv. 51, 52, stuck in the young man's [John Mark's] mind because of his embarrassment at his "involuntary nudation," surely that the "long white garment" is mentioned at the tomb reveals a natural psychological reaction and also—if it were new and unfamiliar—partly explains why the women did not recognize the wearer.) However, this is beside the point. In spite of some reluctance which may be felt at the handling of John side by side with the Synoptists quite in this way, this approach to the problem of the Resurrection is most impressive, illuminating, and valuable. And it seems very difficult to question the finding of the court, that "the upshot of the matter is that there were Appearances to every disciple of whom we know."

NOEL DAVEY.

INDEX TO VOLUME XXIX

JULY—DECEMBER, 1934

PAGE

ADDLESHAW, G. 262
Almsgiving and Modern Life 17
Almsgiving and the Church Overseas 161
APPASAMY, A. J. 82
ARMYTAGE, D. 6
ATCHLEY, CUTHBERT 28

Baptismal Pattern in the New Testament, The 162
BAVERSTOCK, A. H. 301
BEEVOR, H. 112
BELL, BERNARD IDDINGS 71
BLAKENEY, E. H. 164
BONSALL, R.. 303
Books Reviewed:

And the Life Everlasting. By John Baillie 237
Apostolic Tradition of Hippolytus, The. Translated by Burton Scott Easton 372
Civitas Dei. By Lionel Curtis 42
Eccentric Life of Alexander Cruden, The. By Edith Olivier . . . 310
Epistle to the Romans. By Karl Barth 368
Examination of McTaggart's Philosophy, An. Vol I. By C. D. Broad 46
Historical Records of the Church of the Province of South Africa. By C. Lewis and G. E. Edwards. 242
Letters of Stephen Gardiner, The. Edited by J. A. Muller. . . . 44
Mishnah, The. Translated by Herbert Danby 110
Modernist Movement in the Roman Church, The. By A. R. Vidler . 306
New Argument for God and Survival, A. By Malcolm Grant . . . 240
Person of Christ, The. By L. W. Grensted 174
Religious Instruction in the Elementary School. By Canon J. R. Lumb 312
State and Religious Education, The. By E. F. Braley and M. C. Petitpierre 312
Unknown God, The. By Alfred Noyes. 112

BOUQUET, A. C. 327
BURNINGHAM, G. W. 91

CARRINGTON, P. 162
Catholic Renewal in Italy and the Mission to the Waldensians, The . . 147
CLARKE, W. K. LOWTHER 106, 172
"Corpus Christi" 36
Correspondence 36, 105, 161, 295, 360, 361
CROSS, F. L.. 240

DEMANT, V. A. 296
Devout Rhyme, A. 367
Diocesan Synods 262
DIX, GREGORY 287
DOWNTON, F. M. 226
Dr. Rashdall's Theology 295
Dutch View of the Philosophy of Religion, A 303
Dyovouniotes and the Apostolic Succession 169

Eighteenth-Century High Churchman, An 272
Emotional Scepticism 349
Ending of St. Mark, The 106
Epiclesis; A Criticism, The 28
Epiclesis: Some Considerations, The 287
EVERY, E. 169

PAGE

Faith of the Resurrection as "Life in Christ," The 199
German Catholic Philosophy of Religion, A 327
GREAVES, R. W. 272
GREY, ROWLAND 352

HARDMAN, OSCAR 174

JANNI, UGO 147
JENKINS, CLAUDE 44
JULIUS AFRICANUS 164

King and His Kingdom, The 301

LEE, E. K. 361
LEVERTOFF, PAUL. 110
"Liberal Catholics and the Incarnation" 360
LILLEY, A. L. 199, 306
LYTTELTON, E. 17, 226

MACARTHUR, J. S. 349
MACLEAN, A. J. 372
MARKHAM, R. F. 226
MASCALL, E. L. 46
Meditations of a Philosopher, The 361
MIDDLETON, R. D. 40, 41
Miracle 36
MOZLEY, J. K. 135, 368
Mr. More, Liberal Catholics and the Incarnation 155

NASH, BISHOP J. O. 242
Noëls of Emile Cammaërts 352
Note on St. Luke ii. 49 365
Notes on Periodicals 107, 108, 109, 173, 236, 367

Œcumenicity 71
Orthodoxy: A Little Symposium 226

PARKER, J. W. 37
PASS, H. L. 237
PITTENGER, W. N. 155
Prayer to the Holy Spirit. 219, 361
Prayers For the King in the First Century 172
PRIDEAUX, S. P. T. 219, 227
Problem of Church and State, The 296
Proem of the Epistle to the Ephesians, The 232

Recent Changes in the South India Scheme 82
"Regnum Dei" and the Modern World, The 6
Restoration of the Worshipful Life, The 91
Risen Christ and the Historical Order, The 135
ROGERS C. F. 208

St. Luke xvi. 9 41
SEAMAN, C. 365
Shema' 40
SLESSOR, LORD JUSTICE 42
Standing for the Psalms. 208, 360
SWANN, N. E. EGERTON. 226

TAYLOR, R. O. P. 232
Three Prayers 37
TILLYARD, ÆLFRIDA 310
Two Liturgical Experiments 366

Veni Creator Spiritus 39

WILLIAMS, N. P. 228
WINTER, S. M. 311
WYLDE, J. 39, 367

PRINTED IN GREAT BRITAIN BY BILLING AND SONS LTD., GUILDFORD AND ESHER